

Independent Office
of Evaluation

 **LIFAD**
Investing in rural people

Republic of Maldives

Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries
Rehabilitation Programme

PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION



Independent Office
of Evaluation



Republic of Maldives
Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries
Rehabilitation Programme
Project Performance Evaluation

Photos of activities supported by the Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme

Front cover: Fish trading in front of the fish market funded by the programme, Nolvivaramfaru island.

Back cover: Demonstration by the extension workers, Nolvivaramfaru island (left); Water melon farm supported by the programme, Nolvivaramfaru island.

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Preface

The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertook a project performance evaluation of the Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme in the Republic of Maldives to provide an independent assessment of the overall results of the programme and generate lessons and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in the country. The programme was designed as a response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and was the first programme operated by IFAD in the Maldives.

The programme was implemented between 2005 and 2013, with the aim to contribute to restoring agricultural gross domestic product to pre-tsunami levels, returning the economy to a stable, long-term growth trend and reducing the fishery sector's vulnerability to natural disasters. The programme made little progress in the first three years, which meant the original design of the programme was only partially relevant to the rapidly changing country context. After the Mid-term Review, the programme was revitalized to focus on the country's development needs, rather than on disaster relief restoration.

Additionally, the initial design focused more on physical inputs – e.g. new boats, new markets, new ice plants – and less on capacity-building or training. The revitalization shifted the focus of the programme from direct support to the fishery and agriculture sectors to policy support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture.

The programme could have been better revitalized with effective programme planning and a clear intervention logic. Although there was a wholesale set of changes in the components of the programme, there was no systematic reconsideration of the programme's overall objectives. As a result, the programme was most effective at national policy level with regard to sustainable fishing, but it is rather difficult to measure any direct effect at ground level.

The project performance assessment was conducted by Shijie Yang, Evaluation Analyst, IOE, in collaboration with senior consultant Dr Roderick Stirrat (fishery and agricultural specialist). Peer reviewers – Fumiko Nakai, Senior Evaluation Officer, Simona Somma, Evaluation Officer, and Fabrizio Felloni, Deputy Director, IOE – provided comments on the draft report. Chabana Bagas, Karina Gun Linnea and Delphine Bureau, Evaluation Assistants, provided administrative support.

IOE is grateful to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture of the Republic of Maldives and to IFAD's Asia and the Pacific Division for their cooperation and support and for the valuable comments provided during the evaluation process. I hope the results generated by this project performance assessment will be useful to inform and improve IFAD operations and activities in the Maldives for enhanced development effectiveness.



Oscar A. Garcia
Director
Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD

Water melon farm, supported by the programme. Nohivaramfaru island.

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Currency equivalent, weights and measures

Currency equivalent

Currency unit	=	Maldivian Rufiyaa (MVR)
US\$1.0	=	MVR 15.01

Weights and measures

1 kilogram	=	1,000 g
1 kg	=	2.204 lb
1 kilometre (km)	=	0.62 mile
1 metre	=	1.09 yards
1 square metre	=	10.76 square feet
1 acre	=	0.405 hectare
1 hectare	=	2.47 acres


Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
APR	Asia and the Pacific Division (IFAD)
CBPO	Community-based producer organization
EIRR	economic internal rate of return
FADiP	Fisheries and Agricultural Diversification Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FTC	Fisheries Training Centre
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICRAF	International Center for Research in Agroforestry
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
IOTC	Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MFAMR	Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Marine Resources (renamed Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture (MoFA) in 2008)
MFDA	Maldives Food and Drug Authority
MoFA	Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture
MSC	Marine Stewardship Council
MTR	Mid-term review
OIS	outcome impact survey
PCR	project completion report
PIU	programme implementation unit
PMD	Programme Management Department
PPE	project performance evaluation
PT-AFReP	Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme
SDR	Special Drawing Right
SMEs	Small- and medium-sized enterprises
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
VLD	vessel location devices
VMS	vessel monitoring system

Map of the programme area

Maldives

Post Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

IFAD Map compiled by IFAD

Executive summary

1. **Background.** The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertook a project performance evaluation (PPE) of the Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme (PT-AFRoP) in the Republic of Maldives with the objectives of: (i) assessing the results of the programme; and (ii) generating findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in the Maldives. This assessment is based on a review of various project-related documents and a mission to the Maldives in September 2016, which visited the project areas and held interviews and discussions with various key stakeholders, including beneficiaries.
2. **The programme context.** The programme was designed as a response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which directly affected nearly a third of the population in the Maldives. Regarding the fishing sector, the tsunami damaged 12 per cent of the total fleet; however, the fisheries' post-harvest sector was more seriously affected – particularly small-scale fish processors and fish landing sites. The agricultural sector was also badly damaged, crops destroyed and the land salinized. Given the urgency of the situation, IFAD's usual three-phase "Inception, Formulation, and Appraisal Mission" design was not completed. Instead a single design mission visited the country in February 2005 and the IFAD Executive Board approved the programme in April 2005.
3. The programme's overall goals were to contribute to restoring agricultural gross domestic product to pre-tsunami levels, returning the economy to a stable, long-term growth trend and reducing the fishery sector's vulnerability to natural disasters. Specifically, it aimed to help re-establish the country's fishing operations and augment the household income of fishers by restoring their livelihoods. With regard to agriculture, the programme aimed to encourage crop production in the atolls so as to rebuild the islanders' livelihoods and improve their diets, increase household incomes, reduce poverty and ensure food security.
4. The four programme components were: (i) recovery and sustainable development of the fisheries sector; (ii) recovery and sustainable development of the agriculture sector; (iii) policy support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture (MoFA); and (iv) programme coordination. The programme was financed by an initial IFAD loan (US\$2,100,000) and a grant (US\$210,000), approved on 19 April 2005. A second loan (US\$2,175,000) was approved in September 2005 under the 2006 budget cycle to fill the financial gap. The actual programme costs were US\$4.473 million, against US\$4.988 million at appraisal, which was financed by IFAD loans (90.7 per cent), IFAD grant (4.5 per cent) and the government (4.8 per cent).
5. **Effectiveness gap.** The programme became effective in April 2006, 12 months after the board's approval. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) supervised the programme implementation from 2006 until the mid-term review (MTR) in 2008, during which no supervision missions were conducted. There were no disbursements during the first three years. With the change of government in 2008, the programme was significantly revitalized by the MTR, and IFAD took over direct supervision. The programme was completed on 31 December 2013, two years after the originally planned completion date.
6. **Target and programme area.** The original fishing component focused on four islands affected by the tsunami and the inhabitants who would benefit from improved fish handling facilities. In addition, the original plan envisaged support for the construction of ten fishing boats, which would benefit an estimated 150 fishers. The agricultural component aimed to cover 50 tsunami-affected islands, among which 26 "most eligible" islands were identified by MoFA as the primary target area. The selection criteria included: (i) agricultural importance; (ii) incidence of poverty and vulnerability; and (iii) levels of food insecurity. After programme

revitalization introduced by the MTR, the programme target area shrank from 50 agricultural islands to 30,¹ while two of the fishery focus islands were also changed. By completion, the programme had reached 6,086 households.

7. **Programme revitalization.** The initial design focused more on physical inputs – new boats, new markets, new ice plants – and less on capacity-building or training. By 2008-2009 it was clear that the original programme was unsuitable for the changing context, and that little progress had been made. This was the result of political changes in the Maldives, the activities of other donors, agencies that made some of the planned activities of IFAD redundant, and a realization that some of the original planned activities were misconceived. Consequently, the programme went through a revitalization process in the MTR. This shifted the programme's focus from direct support to the fishery and agriculture sectors to policy support to MoFA (the share of costs of component 3 rose from 8.6 per cent to 32.8 per cent of the total).
8. **Relevance.** The programme objectives included both recovery and developmental aspects. It was generally in line with the government's Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Plan and IFAD's policies. However, the formulation of the programme objectives stressed gross domestic product (GDP) restoration rather than rural livelihoods, rural poverty and the empowerment of rural people, which were much more within IFAD's mandate. Additionally, with such a small loan amount, the objective of contributing to agricultural GDP was too ambitious.
9. By the time the programme implementation started, it was no longer concerned with "restoration" but rather with improving the livelihoods of people who had in some way been affected by the tsunami. However, in the revitalization process, there was no systemic consideration of the overall objectives and purposes of the programme. The result was a series of discrete activities only loosely related to each other without a clear logic or theory of change linking them together. The design issues and continuous changes in implementation affected planning and severely limited the effectiveness of the programme.
10. **Relevance of targeting.** The targeting strategy was neither clear nor coherent in both agricultural and fishery components. According to the President's report, "the agriculture islands were selected on the basis of both the level of damage caused by the tsunami and vulnerability of the rural population". During implementation, the programme failed to specify the criteria for selecting sites in terms of levels of damage, and the programme adopted a geographical targeting approach, rather than an approach related to poverty or food security criteria.
11. **Main findings.** The implementation of the fishery component had mixed success. The fish "markets" did not have a major impact on the fishery sector as they were either underused or poorly located (e.g. Vilufushi). Although programme documents refer to them as "markets", they were intended to function as fish receiving stations for fish cutting and cleaning rather than for fish trading.
12. The credit supplied to construct ice plants helped fishery exporters exploit the market for high-quality fish, and the vessels with icing facilities enjoyed higher profit margins than those without. However, only relatively large or state-owned companies received the credit rather than the intended beneficiaries – small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
13. Both the agriculture and fishery components supported the establishment of community-based producer organizations (CBPOs). However, the design and implementation of CBPOs were weak. No fishery CBPOs were established and only 10 agricultural CBPOs were formed, against the target of 150. This happened because the purpose, role and composition of CBPOs was not defined adequately, a

¹ On the same page of the 2013 supervision report a target of 25 islands was also given. supervision report, p. 73, 2013.

competent cadre of facilitators was not established and this type of organization was not rooted in local traditions in the Maldives.

14. The programme did have a positive effect on agriculture in that it encouraged the introduction of new crops and new techniques using irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides. However, the programme would have benefitted from greater attention being paid to marketing and transport and the need to tailor production to the demands of the market, especially in the resort islands. These matters have been addressed by a subsequent IFAD project – the Fisheries and Agricultural Diversification Programme (FADiP).
15. At national policy level the programme was most effective with regard to sustainable fishing. There were some major successes concerning sustainable fishing – for instance, supporting membership in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and gaining Marine Stewardship Council certification for pole- and line- caught fish. The initiation of a vessel monitoring system (VMS) enabled MoFA to improve its management of oceanic resources to ensure environmental sustainability. However, in terms of IFAD’s responsibility to address poverty issues in rural communities, it is not clear that these components of the programme had any direct effect.
16. **Efficiency.** Programme efficiency was impaired by the prolonged procurement process, low management efficiency, slow disbursement and the increased cost per direct beneficiary. A similar amount of budget was disbursed without the realization of some key programme outputs (e.g. no fish-landing facilities in Hulhumale, poor record of training, reduction in the number of programme islands).
17. **Rural poverty impact.** Quantitative data relating to the possible impact of the programme on rural poverty are limited. This makes the assessment of the programme’s poverty impact particularly difficult. During the lifetime of the programme, the price of fish almost doubled and the income of fishers almost tripled as a national average. But there are too many confounding factors to allow these changes to be attributed to this programme.
18. The impact domain most visibly affected by the programme consists of "institutions and policies", due to the support it gave to both central policy formulation and grass-roots rural institutions.
19. **Gender equity.** Other than collecting gender-disaggregated data, the programme made almost no attempt to mainstream gender concerns. None of the three areas defined in IFAD’s Gender Plan of Action (2003) (i.e. access to resources/assets, women’s workload distribution and women’s influence in decision-making) was reflected in the programme design and implementation. Although the absence of gender considerations was lamented many times in various supervision reports, no measures were taken to directly address gender issues.

Recommendations:

20. **Recommendation 1. In post-disaster situations, IFAD should not focus on immediate disaster relief,** but rather on “initiatives that help bridge the gap between emergency relief and the restoration of the development process”. IFAD's internal structure and financial instrument is not geared towards rapid response and/or post-disaster operations. A stress on speed of reaction can lead to poorly designed projects or programmes; thus the *ex-ante* quality assurance procedures within IFAD should not be waived. Additionally, the loan format is probably not suited to quick responses in emergency situations but rather to later phases in the recovery process. Countries in a post-disaster context tend to have lower absorptive capacities for finances from various international players, and a later engagement could also ensure the counterparts have better absorptive capacities.
21. **Recommendation 2. The design should address long-term goals rather than short-term needs, even in a post-disaster programme.** The design

should be based on rigorous technical assessment and an effective theory of change that underline the constraints and issues leading to long-term agricultural/fishery development in the country. What has to be avoided is an approach that is dependent on the preconceived ideas of both donors and recipients without proper consideration of local needs and community context.

22. **Recommendation 3. Targeting should be based on sound technical justifications.** This requires both a clear theory of change and solid baseline information in order to identify the intended beneficiary groups/geographic areas in the programme design stage. A poverty index and a specific need index could be combined for such a targeting strategy to ensure that programme investment is utilized wisely. Additionally, any construction work should also take into account its catchment area and utilization rate for the intended beneficiaries.
23. **Recommendation 4. Sufficient resource and guidance on building monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems and conducting impact studies should be provided.** M&E systems should pay more attention to outcome and impact level indicators as well as to input and output levels. There should be sufficient financial and human resources to support essential studies and surveys as needed. The impact assessment should be rigorously conducted in order to gain more meaningful information, specifically by considering the counterfactual and applying proper statistic methods and sampling strategy.
24. **Recommendation 5. Gender equality and women's empowerment should be supported with a more systematic approach in the fishery sector.** In fishery programmes, men tend to be the primary beneficiaries while women's roles are limited to fish processing. In order to mainstream women's participation, the design needs to include support for fish processing and other activities in which women also participate. Training should also be customized to the special needs of women with regard to location, timing and manner of delivery.

IFAD Management's response¹

1. Management welcomes the project performance evaluation (PPE) of the Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme (PT-AFREP) in the Republic of Maldives, and wishes to express its appreciation for the candidness of the report.
2. Overall, Management agrees with IOE's assessment of the programme's performance and notes that the PPE recognizes the particular achievement by PT-AFREP in the area of policy and overall environment of the fishery sector, with positive contributions to the long-term sustainability of the sector.
3. Despite IFAD's commitment to respond and act quickly in the face of an unprecedented disaster, Management recognizes that haste and the changing nature of the post-tsunami situation served to limit the quality of the initial design, particularly for longer-term relevancy in a rapidly changing environment. Management also acknowledges the shortcomings in defining a solid targeting strategy, which hampered the design and the ultimate effectiveness of the programme.
4. Management appreciates the PPE recommendations which are generally already being internalized and acted upon. Management's detailed views on the proposed recommendations are presented below:

- **Post-disaster situations.** *In post-disaster situations, IFAD should not focus on immediate disaster relief, but rather on "initiatives that help bridge the gap between emergency relief and the restoration of the development process".*

Response from Management: Agreed. This recommendation is aligned with the IFAD Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2006), which put emphasis on the role of IFAD in supporting interventions that promote the process of transitioning from relief to recovery. With inter-agency collaboration and partnerships, this position is also reinforced. Moreover, since 2011, the IFAD guidelines for Early Disaster Recovery also provide for a rigorous internal process ensuring the quality of project design in cases of disaster response, as well as the inclusion of activities that IFAD should carry out to support the transition from recovery to longer-term development.

- **Long-term goals.** *In the recovery process, the design should address long-term goals rather than short-term needs, with a demand-driven participatory approach and technical assessment to prevent underuse and inefficient investments.*

Response from Management: Agreed. The design approach and model under which IFAD operates in the Maldives, has changed considerably since PT-AFREP was designed. Today, IFAD maintains a rigorous design process to ensure quality and relevance of the design, through the regular review by the Country Programme Management Team as well as Quality Enhancement and Quality Assurance reviews. Among other things, the review system in place ensures that participatory and demand-driven approaches are adopted at design, which has been the case for the current portfolio. Furthermore, throughout project implementation, IFAD's supervision and implementation support allow for remedial actions to be taken to ensure the longer-term relevance of project interventions.

- **Targeting.** *A targeting strategy must be developed and implemented in a systematic way based on sound technical justifications.*

¹ The Programme Management Department sent the final Management response to the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD on 28/02/2017.

Response from Management: Agreed. Management again wishes to draw attention to the vastly changed context and design approach adopted by IFAD today, where targeting and good understanding of the poverty context is a fundamental premise of project design.

- **Effective M&E systems.** *There must be sufficient investment and support to capacity-building to ensure effective M&E systems, analytical studies and documentation.*

Response from Management: Agreed. This message has been communicated extensively to national stakeholders and counterparts, and has been translated by the investment in updating the M&E systems of ongoing projects in the Maldives, with dedicated M&E staff.

Furthermore, as part of the Development Effectiveness Framework, the following ongoing corporate actions will contribute to the implementation of the recommendation: (i) upgrading of the Results and Impact Management System; (ii) improvement of key tools to measure and manage for results, including logical frameworks; (iii) establishment of processes to track results in real time through IT systems; and (v) use of broader impact assessments of IFAD activities to maximize learning. Moreover, through the US\$3.5 million CLEAR grant, approved by the Executive Board in September 2016, Management will sponsor systematic training and certification of project staff across IFAD's operations on M&E and impact assessment. A customized curriculum will be taught in a modularized way within a wider project management approach, as opposed to purely technical competency, and trainings will be delivered in regional locations (including three locations in the Asia and the Pacific region).

- **Gender and women's empowerment.** *Gender equality and women's empowerment should be supported with a more systematic approach.*

Response from Management: Agreed. Future investments will undertake gender-sensitive poverty and livelihoods analysis at design; for ongoing investments, Gender Action Plans have been initiated to better mainstream gender issues and their monitoring during implementation.

5. Management thanks IOE for the productive process and is committed to internalize lessons learned and outcomes of this exercise to further improve the performance of IFAD-funded programmes in the Maldives and elsewhere.

Innovative cooking training conducted by the extension workers. Maduvari island.

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Republic of Maldives

Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme

Project Performance Evaluation

I. Evaluation objectives, methodology and process

1. **Background.** The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertakes project performance evaluations (PPEs) for a number of selected completed projects and programmes.¹ The Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme (PT-AFReP) in the Maldives was selected for a PPE to increase IOE's programme-level evaluative evidence for an upcoming synthesis report on fisheries to be undertaken in 2017.
2. **Objectives and focus.** In general terms, the main objectives of PPEs are: (i) to provide an independent assessment of the overall results of programmes; and (ii) to generate lessons and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations within the country.
3. **Methodology.** The PPE follows the IFAD's Evaluation Policy² and the IFAD/IOE Evaluation Manual (second edition).³ It adopts a set of internationally recognized evaluation criteria (see annex IV) and a six-point rating system (annex I, footnote a). The evaluation was based on a desk review of available data and documents⁴ and a country mission lasting ten days, including field visits. As is normally the case with PPEs, given the time and resource constraints, no extensive primary data collection or surveys were undertaken. Data collection methods included interviews with various stakeholders (government staff, IFAD staff, programme implementation partners, beneficiaries, and key informants), group discussions and direct observations. An evaluation matrix was prepared to guide the field visit and data collection for the fishery component (see annex XII).
4. Given time constraints, the field sites were selected based on the following criteria:
 - (i) Programme investment allocation: priority was given to sites characterized by activities which had received higher investment allocations;
 - (ii) Examples of different activities: the fishery component (e.g. fish markets, ice plants); the agriculture component (e.g. community organizations, agricultural centres); and the policy component (e.g. vessel management system office).
 - (iii) Variations within the same type of activity: sites with different levels of performance were selected to seek representativeness.
 - (iv) Optimizing the use of time: considerations concerning the availability and timing of inter-island transport and whether or not multiple activities took place on one island affected the choice of field sites.
5. **Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data and outcome impact survey.** A baseline survey was completed towards the end of 2009 (three years after the project became effective), using secondary data.⁵ An M&E manual was not

¹ The selection criteria for PPE include: (i) information gaps in project completion reviews (PCRs); (ii) projects of strategic relevance that offer enhanced opportunities for learning; (iii) a need to build evidence for forthcoming corporate level evaluations, country strategy and programme evaluations or evaluation synthesis reports; and (iv) a regional balance of IOE's evaluation programme.

² <http://www.ifad.org/pub/policy/oe.pdf>.

³ http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf.

⁴ Including supervision mission reports, mid-term review report, PCR, baseline survey, outcome surveys, and discussions in the field and interviews with key informants. See also annex XIII for bibliography.

⁵ Normally, all IFAD-funded projects must undertake a primary data collection (household survey) to collect baseline data during the first year of implementation of the project. However, given the particular context of the PT-AFReP and

developed until mid-2009, and the M&E system was not established until after the 2009 mid-term review (MTR).

6. According to the 2010 supervision report, the programme was exempted from undertaking a results and impact management system (RIMS) baseline survey.⁶ RIMS data were collected from 2011 onwards, but only at input and output levels. To fill this gap and provide information on the programme's outcomes and impacts, the programme fielded an outcome and impact survey (OIS) in 2014. This involved the collection of data from 418 randomly selected households, 306 beneficiaries and 112 non-beneficiaries. Unfortunately, the quality of the OIS data is too poor⁷ to allow any before/after comparison or with/without programme analysis.
7. **Process.** The PPE mission⁸ was undertaken between 18 and 27 September 2016. Following initial meetings with stakeholders in the capital (Malé), the team visited a total of seven islands. These included three fishery islands (Maduwaree and Gamanafushi for fishery markets; Hulumale for an ice plant) and four islands where agriculture was more important (Laamu-Gan and Hanimaadhoo agriculture centres, Goidhoo and Nolvivaramfaru). The team met representatives of island councils, fish processors, and community-based producer organizations (CBPOs), as well as CBPO facilitators, ministry extension workers, and beneficiaries of programme-supported measures. The wrap-up meeting, presenting the team's preliminary findings to project stakeholders and IFAD, was held in Malé on 27 September 2016.
8. Following the mission, the team conducted further analysis of the data and findings. The resulting draft report was then peer-reviewed by IOE staff. It was then shared with IFAD's Asia and the Pacific Division (APR) and the Government of the Maldives for comments before being finalized and published.
9. **Data availability and limitations.** The team reviewed, analysed and triangulated data and information from different sources⁹ in order to assess programme performance and obtain evidence or indications in support of (or to challenge) the findings and conclusions of the project completion report (PCR) and other reports. Nonetheless, the serious limitations of data availability and reliability (especially for outcomes and impact) must be kept in mind.

the availability of secondary data collected regularly by the national institutions, it was decided by the PIU, in agreement with IFAD, not to conduct a baseline survey. In this case, the baseline was based on secondary data, mostly available at island or atoll level (IFAD: Monitoring and Evaluation Manual, 2009).

⁶ Supervision report, Technical report, 2010, p. 3.

⁷ For details, see paragraph 102.

⁸ The mission consisted of Shijie Yang (Evaluation Analyst, IOE) and Roderick Stirrat (Fishing and Agriculture Consultant).

⁹ Programme documents, government documents, research reports (see Bibliography for a list) and data and information collected during the field visit.

II. The programme

A. Programme context

10. **Country background.** The Republic of the Maldives is a coral archipelago in the Indian Ocean consisting of a chain of 1,190 islands forming 26 atolls distributed over an area of 90,000 km². Most of the islands are small, flat and low-lying, with an average elevation of 1.6 m above sea level, which renders them particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. The population is around 345,000 scattered over 200 islands.¹⁰ Almost one third of the population is concentrated in the capital, Malé, while 50 per cent of the populated islands have populations below 1,000. The widely scattered population prohibits economies of scale and the delivery of essential social and administrative services is expensive. The wide population distribution also poses unique challenges to relief, recovery and development efforts.¹¹
11. Historically the country was extremely dependent on the export of fish products, mainly to Sri Lanka, but since the 1970s tourism has increasingly dominated the country's economy. Over the long term, fishing has declined in importance in both relative and absolute terms.
12. **Sector context.** The **fisheries sector** is vital for the livelihood of the population. In 2004 the sector employed about 11 per cent of the work force, accounted for over 60 per cent of exports, and was the main source of livelihood for 20 per cent of the people, while contributing some 9.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹² According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) data (2011), some 150,000 metric tonnes of fish are harvested annually, with skipjack and yellowfin tuna dominating the catch¹³ (for details see annex XIII).
13. The development of the **agriculture sector** is limited due to the lack of land available for cultivation, poor soil conditions and a shortage of fresh water for irrigation.¹⁴ Except for coconut and fresh tuna, 90 per cent of all food items are imported. Heavy import dependency, limited storage facilities and ad hoc distribution systems potentially pose severe food security risks.¹⁵ About half of the agricultural land is in the form of "agriculture islands" – islands leased by the state to private entrepreneurs for agriculture development.¹⁶
14. **Poverty profile.** The incidence of poverty in the Maldives is largely in line with that of other upper middle-income countries. According to the household income and expenditure survey 2009/2010, the share of the population living on less than US\$1.25 a day in 2005 PPP (Purchase Power Parity) was 8 per cent, while the share of population living on US\$2 a day or less was 24 per cent.
15. Poverty declined substantially nationwide over the period between 2003 and 2010, across the territory of the Maldives. The country made progress in reducing the poverty rate; while change at the poverty line of US\$1.25 was minimal (from 9 per cent in 2003 to 8 per cent in 2009), the poverty headcount ratio at the international poverty line of US\$2 declined from 31 to 24 per cent during the same

¹⁰ At the time of the tsunami, the total population of the Maldives was around 292,500.

¹¹ IFAD (2005): President's Report.

¹² IFAD (2006): Maldives pre-implementation document, p. 6.

¹³ FAO (2011): Maldives and FAO achievements and success stories, p. 2.

¹⁴ The proportion of agriculturally suitable land is among the lowest in the developing world (IFAD, 2006; IMF 2008).

¹⁵ https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/maldives_12may_sids.pdf.

¹⁶ FAO (2011): Maldives and FAO achievements and success stories, p. 2.

period,¹⁷ and the same trend held when using the national poverty line.¹⁸ However, the improvement in the poverty headcount ratio was not uniform across the Maldives. The poverty rate declined in the atolls but increased sharply in the capital area of Malé (see table 1), mainly due to continued migration from the atolls to the capital. The reduction of poverty at the national level has been driven mainly by improvements in living conditions in the atolls.

Table 1
Headcount ratio for Republic, Malé and atolls – 2002/03 and 2009/10*

Relative poverty lines	Republic		Malé		Atolls	
	2003	2010	2003	2010	2003	2010
International poverty line of US\$1.25 (US\$1 per day poverty line used in Millennium Development Goals)	9%	8%	2%	7%	12%	8%
International poverty line of US\$2	31%	24%	9%	19%	39%	27%
Rf. 22 (Half the Median of Atoll expenditure per person per day for household income and expenditure survey 2009/10)	21%	15%	4%	12%	27%	16%

* The number is slightly higher compared with World Bank's estimation using the same data source.

Note: Poverty lines adjusted for inflation; Comparable Consumption Aggregate based on 2009/10 definition (Source: Department of National Planning: household income and expenditure survey 2009/2010).

16. Despite progress made in poverty reduction, the population has remained vulnerable to exogenous shocks and environmental fragility, due to its small island economy.¹⁹ In addition, according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), there is a high degree of transient income poverty, with individuals moving in and out of poverty, rather than exiting permanently from income poverty (ADB, 2007).²⁰
17. **Programme context.** The tsunami struck the Maldives on 26 December 2004, directly affecting about one third of the population. All but nine islands were flooded and thirteen were totally evacuated. The tsunami destroyed much of the country's physical asset base including homes and entire settlements; public service utilities such as hospitals, clinics and schools; transport and communications infrastructure; private businesses; and livelihoods. As far as fishing was concerned, the fishing fleet itself was relatively undamaged as most craft were at sea when the tsunami hit the Maldives. In total, about 120 vessels were lost or seriously damaged – around 12 per cent of the total fleet. The fisheries' post-harvest sector was more seriously affected – in particular, small-scale fish processors and fish landing sites. The agricultural sector was also badly damaged, crops destroyed and the land salinized. The Joint Needs Assessment carried out by the World Bank, the ADB, the United Nations System and the Government of the Maldives estimated the total losses at US\$470.1 million or 62 per cent of GDP.²¹
18. Given the urgency of the situation, the normal IFAD three-stage design phase, comprising inception, formulation and appraisal missions, was not completed. Instead, a single design mission visited the country in February 2005 and the IFAD

¹⁷ The World Bank's estimate is 4.9 per cent using Purchasing Power Parity methods (US\$1.25 in PPP per day) and 17.02 per cent for the US\$2 per day poverty line.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/12/25715444/maldives-systematic-country-diagnostic-information-notice>. The welfare measure used is consumption per capita. The extreme poverty line is estimated from individual consumption data. Data are produced by World Bank. Poverty measures are shares of population.

¹⁸ The poverty declined by seven percentage points, from 21 per cent in 2003 to approximately 15 per cent, if using the national poverty line (Rf. 22: Half the Median of Atoll expenditure per person per day for the household income and expenditure survey 2009/10).

¹⁹ Performant mission of the Republic of Maldives to the United Nations. (2013) Eradication of Poverty Statement in Second Committee by HE Ahmed Sareer.

²⁰ Asian Development Bank. (2007) Maldives: Poverty Assessment. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

²¹ World Bank-ADB-UN System (2005) Joint Needs Assessment of Maldives Tsunami: Impact and Recovery.

Executive Board approved the programme in April 2005. Because there had been insufficient time for thorough consultation with the Government of the Maldives concerning the design of its components and activities, the programme was approved with provisions for built-in flexibility during implementation.²² The Technical Review Committee of IFAD requested that a pre-implementation mission be undertaken soon after the programme was declared effective in order to "adjust the design to the rapidly evolving (aid) situation, as well as to fill design gaps".²³

19. **Programme objectives.** The overall goal of the programme was to contribute to restoring agricultural GDP to pre-tsunami levels, returning the economy to a stable, long-term growth trend and reducing the fishery sector's vulnerability to natural disasters. Specifically, it aimed to help re-establish the country's fishing operations and augment the household income of fishers by restoring their livelihoods. With regard to agriculture, the programme aimed to encourage crop production in the atolls so as to rebuild the islanders' livelihoods and improve their diets, increase household incomes, reduce poverty and ensure food security.²⁴
20. **Programme components.** The programme was organized around four main components listed in the President's Report as follows:
 - (i) **Component 1. Recovery and sustainable development of the fisheries sector.** This component consisted of three main activities: (a) support to fisheries production; (b) fish marketing; and (c) training and extension.
 - (ii) **Component 2. Recovery and sustainable development of the agricultural sector.** This component involved two main activities: (a) agricultural marketing; and (b) adaptive research and agricultural extension.
 - (iii) **Component 3. Policy support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture.** The programme aimed to provide a grant to the Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Marine Resources (MFAMR)/Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture (MoFA) to enable it to deal with policy issues related to fisheries and agriculture, including those that have arisen following the tsunami disaster.
 - (iv) **Component 4. Programme coordination.** The programme coordination component included the establishment of a programme implementation unit (PIU) within the Ministry, as well as staff training in procurement, auditing, programme management and monitoring, preparation of reports and consultancies.

Table 3 shows the financial weight attributed to each component.

21. **Programme area.** The original fishing component focused on four islands affected by the tsunami: Dhiggaru in Meemu atoll; Vilhufushi in Thaa atoll; Maamendhoo in Laamu atoll; and Madaveli in Ghaaf Dhalu atoll, with a total population of 8,145. The people on these islands would benefit from improved fish handling facilities. In addition, the original plan envisaged support for the construction of ten fishing boats which, it was estimated, would benefit about 150 fishers. Fishing communities where inhabitants of tsunami-affected islands were resettled were also expected to benefit from the programme, although it was not clear exactly how.
22. As far as the agricultural sector was concerned, the original programme aimed to cover 50 tsunami-affected islands. Among those islands, the MFAMR identified 26 "most eligible" islands as the primary target area (see table 2). This was based on

²² IFAD approved an initial loan (of SDR 1.4 million) and an initial grant (of SDR 0.14 million) in April 2005, which became effective in April 2006. In addition, a supplementary loan of SDR 1.45 million became effective in December 2006. These approvals had been given before the programme design document was produced in July 2006.

²³ IFAD (2006) Maldives pre-implementation document, p. 1.

²⁴ President's Report, p. 3.

the level of damage caused by the tsunami and the vulnerability of the rural population. The remaining 24 islands were to be selected by the MFAMR during programme implementation. The selection criteria included: (a) agricultural importance; (b) incidence of poverty and vulnerability; and (c) levels of food insecurity.

23. After the programme revitalization in 2009-2010, the revised geographical area to be covered by the agriculture component was reduced to 30 islands.²⁵ By completion, the programme had reached 6,086 households.

Table 2

List of the 26 agricultural islands most affected by the tsunami

<i>Atoll</i>	<i>Island</i>
Baa	Kihaadhoo, Goidhoo, Kendhoo (3)
Dhaalu	Badidhoo, Kadahuvadhoo (2)
Gaafu Alifu	Dhaandhoo (1)
Haa Alifu	Filladhoo, Baarah (2)
Haa Dhaalu	Nolhivaranfaru, Nellaidhoo, Vaikaradhoo (3)
Kaafu	Kaashidhoo (1)
Laamu	Dhabidhoo, Isdhoo, Gamu (3)
Meemu	Kolhufushi, Mulah (2)
Noonu	Kudafari, Kedhikolhudhoo (2)
Seenu	Hulhudhoo (1)
Shaviyani	Narudhoo, Feevah Kaditheemu, Foakaidhoo (4)
Thaa	Buruni, Kibidhoo (2)

24. **Target group and targeting approach.** The programme adopted a geographical targeting approach overall; however, the claim was also made that the primary target groups for agricultural components were poor farming households²⁶ and those whose crops and production assets were destroyed or damaged by the tsunami. It was estimated that 5,000 households (or 20,000 beneficiaries) living in an area of approximately 1,000 ha would be assisted.²⁷
25. **Programme financing.** A breakdown of programme financing by component is shown in table 3 and the sources of programme funds are shown in table 4. According to the PCR, the disbursement of the IFAD loan 663-MV (Special Drawing Right [SDR] 1.4 million, equivalent to US\$2.1 million) was 99.91 per cent, the disbursement of the IFAD loan 692-MV (SDR 1.45 million, equivalent to US\$2.175 million) was 81.07 per cent and the disbursement of the IFAD grant was 99.74 per cent. The Italian grant did not materialize.²⁸ The government's actual cost amounted to 111.4 per cent of the estimated contribution at appraisal.

²⁵ On the same page of the 2013 supervision report a target of 25 islands was also given. Supervision report, p. 73, 2013.

²⁶ President's Report, p. 3.

²⁷ With the reduction of the programme area for agriculture activities, the number of primary target groups was also reduced.

²⁸ When the programme was initially approved by the Board in 2005, there was a financing gap; part of it was left to the 2006's budget cycle and the remaining US\$500,000 to the Italian fund. However, the Italian Supplementary Fund was not completely secured at that moment, according to the minutes of negotiation (2005).

Table 3

Planned and actual programme financing by component (US\$ '000)

Component	Appraisal budget		Disbursed	
	US\$	%	US\$	%
A. Recovery and sustainable development of the fisheries sector	3 131	65.4	1 758.8	39.3
B. Recovery and sustainable development of the agriculture sector	1 111	23.2	710.4	15.9
C. Policy support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture	413.2	8.6	1 465.2	32.8
D. Programme coordination	132.6	2.8	538.9	12.0
Total	4 988.3	100	4 473.3	100

Table 4

Sources of programme funds (US\$ '000)

Financier	Appraisal		Disbursed	
	US\$	%	US\$	%
IFAD loan	4 095	82.1	4 058	90.7
IFAD grant	200	4.0	200	4.5
Italian grant	500	10.0	0.0	0.0
Government	193	3.9	215	4.8
Beneficiaries	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	4 988	100	4 473	100

Notes: The IFAD budget is composed of three parts: a) loan number 663-MV (SDR 1,400,000, approximately equivalent to US\$2,100,000); b) Grant number 783-MV (SDR 140,000, approximately equivalent to US\$210,000), effective date 30 June 2006; c) loan number 692-MV (SDR 1,450,000, approximately equivalent to US\$2,175,000), effective date 12 October 2006.

B. Programme implementation

26. **Time frame.** The initial IFAD loan (663-MV, US\$2.048 million) and grant (783-MV, US\$200,000) were approved on 19 April 2005 and became effective on 21 April 2006. The second loan (692-MV) for the same programme was approved in September 2005. The programme was completed on 31 December 2013, two years after the originally planned completion date.
27. **Implementation arrangements.** The MFAMR²⁹ was the lead implementing agency. The programme was implemented as part of the government's *Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Programme* under the supervision of an independent steering committee comprising representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Treasury, Atoll Development, National Planning, the MFAMR and private-sector organizations. A PIU was set up in the MFAMR, to oversee the implementation of the programme. The fisheries component was managed by the Director of Fisheries and Marine Resources; the agriculture component was managed at the central level by the Director of Agriculture and Forestry Services and by an agricultural officer at each agriculture centre.
28. **Programme monitoring and evaluation.** During the first years of the programme there does not seem to have been any systematic approach to M&E. After the M&E manual was introduced in 2009, the programme established an M&E system. A full-time M&E officer was recruited to the PIU for overall coordination. At lower levels, CBPO facilitators³⁰ were assigned as island-level M&E focal points to link programme management with the communities. These M&E focal points

²⁹ It was renamed Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture (MoFA) when the new government was formed in 2008.

³⁰ CBPO facilitators were trained under the agriculture policy component as trainers of trainers for the extension service.

reported to the M&E officer at the PIU. Beneficiary farmers and fishers were provided with a log book for data recording and four sets of questionnaires for data collection. The field questionnaires, with a focus on outputs, were partly analysed to develop monthly, quarterly, biannual and annual reports.

29. **Supervision arrangements.** Initially, the United Nations Office for Programme Services (UNOPS) was appointed as the cooperating institution responsible for supervising the programme and administrating the finances (as per the President's report and the loan agreement). No supervision missions were undertaken during the period of UNOPS management. As part of the overall IFAD corporate shift to direct supervision, IFAD took over direct supervision of the programme on 1 January 2008, with the first supervision mission in November 2008.
30. **Adjustments during implementation.** By the time of the 2008 supervision mission, it was clear that the original programme design was no longer relevant. Little progress had been made on the programme, other donors had been active in relevant areas, and the new Maldivian government (which had come into power just before the supervision mission and ended the 30-year rule of the former government) introduced radically new policies. These included a stress on fiscal discipline and a balanced budget, and a shift from direct participation in the economy to a facilitating role which allowed the private sector greater autonomy to react to market forces.³¹ These various factors led to the major revision or "revitalization" of the programme at the time of the MTR in April 2009. Although the stated objective of each component remained the same, the content of these components was revised.
31. Under the **fisheries component**, the main changes included:
 - (i) The original proposal of constructing 10 pole and line vessels was modified when project implementation started and instead, 8 new longline boats were to be financed for the opening of a new fishery. However, in agreement with IFAD, the new government dropped this activity.
 - (ii) This component also included building of four new fish landing sites at which fish would be landed, cut and cleaned before being processed. It is clear from the documents that these were not meant to be markets in the conventional sense of sites where fish would be bought and sold, but the term "market" is used in many programme documents.³² Despite IFAD's misgivings this component was retained.³³
 - (iii) Another main proposed activity was the establishment of four ice plants. This goal was modified after the "revitalization": the programme was going to provide credit lines for the private sector to build and operate these factories instead of building them directly. Until 2012, it was intended that this would form the basis of a rotating credit facility but this was dropped.
 - (iv) Support for training and extension work continued, with more funds being available due to the cancellation of new vessel construction.
32. The original proposals for the **agriculture component** were rather vague but did include support for training and extension work and the upgrading or construction of a new fresh produce market in Malé. The latter was dropped. After the "revitalization" of the programme, the key element of this component consisted of support for CBPOs. Despite interviews with various key players and close reading of the available documents, it is not clear to the evaluation team what CBPOs actually were or are. Almost any sort of relationship or association could be seen as the

³¹ Thus the construction of longline vessels in the Maldives was rejected by the new government due to concerns over their financial viability. (supervision report, 2008).

³² They were also called "fish-receiving stations" in the 2006 design report and in the 2008 supervision report. But generally they were referred to as "fish markets".

³³ Working paper 1 Fishery Management and Policy of supervision report (2013), p. 1.

basis for a CBPO. Through these CBPOs it was envisaged that farmers would develop new expertise and grow new crops, especially those in demand from the resort islands.

33. The revitalized programme also stressed the importance of “facilitators” and these became a second core element in the agriculture component. Not only were they expected to assist in the formation of CBPOs but also to act as channels through which information and advice could be passed from the extension service to the farmers and form the lowest level of the M&E system.
34. More generally, the “revitalization process” after the MTR laid much more stress on institution- and capacity-building activities under the policy support component compared with the original programme design. This is reflected by the changes in project costs (table 3). In all, there were 13 outputs in the policy component, most of them introduced at the time of the “revitalization”, and most of them concerned with the fisheries sector. These ranged from support to gain Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification for pole- and line-caught tuna and support for the Maldives to gain full membership in the India Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), to assistance in creating skills in longline fishing and inputs into the establishment of a boat building code.
35. In terms of organization, the programme now had a full-time director and the M&E system was overhauled. A new logframe was also produced against which progress could be measured.
36. **Amendments to the financing agreement.** The financing agreement was amended six times for loan 663-MV and grant 783-MV and once for loan 692-MV. These amendments were the result of: (i) changes made when IFAD took over direct supervision from UNOPS (22 March 2008); (ii) revisions to Procurement Guidelines (4 February 2009); (iii) revisions made during the MTR to the fisheries and agriculture component activities, as well as to the programme area (7 September 2009); (iv) an increase in the authorized ceiling, modification of the disbursement condition and modification of the composition of the steering committee (2 October 2010); and (v) loan reallocation and extension (22 December 2011 and 14 November 2012).³⁴
37. **The underlying theory of change.** There was no clear or explicit theory of change underlying the formulation of this programme. When the programme was conceived, the underlying assumption was that physical inputs (boats, ice plants, “markets”) would lead to the restoration of the incomes of fishing households. Similarly, in the agricultural sector the emphasis was on construction activities,³⁵ which again were expected to restore livelihoods.
38. After the MTR, although the stated objectives and overall structure of the programme remained the same, the revised logframe for the programme involved a *de facto* shift towards a stress on general developmental goals, support for rural livelihoods and institutional strengthening of the relevant agencies.
39. The new theory of change³⁶ involved three components:
 - (i) *A fishery component.* By establishing four fish “markets”, supplying credit to SMEs to construct ice plants, and through training to improve fish processing, it was expected that post-harvest losses would be reduced and the quality of fish improved. The result would be that fishing operations would be re-established and the incomes of fishing households augmented, which was also expected to increase the fisheries GDP.

³⁴ The loan extension has also been made to loan 692-MV.

³⁵ e.g. Construction of fresh food market facility in Malé and building/rehabilitating agricultural centres.

³⁶ See Annex VII for fuller details of the Theory of Change.

- (ii) *An agriculture component.* This consisted of support to agriculture centres and extension services, assisting in the establishment of CBPOs, and encouraging high-value agriculture through intensification and diversification of agriculture practices. These activities were expected to increase agricultural GDP.
 - (iii) *A policy component.* The objective was to improve national capacity in policy formulation, planning and management. This was to be achieved by providing assistance to MoFA and other stakeholders (CBPOs, the Maldives Food and Drug Authority (MFDA), the Fishery Training Centre) in the fisheries and agriculture sectors. Furthermore, Marine Stewardship Certification would allow the Maldives access to premium markets in Europe, thus increasing export prices and contributing to the objective of augmenting the household income of fishers.
40. The causal links in this theory of change depended on certain assumptions, which proved false during programme design and implementation; for details see the Relevance section. These included:
- (i) *Reach assumption:* the assumption that the programme could effectively reach the intended beneficiary groups (see Relevance paragraphs).
 - (ii) *Capacity change assumption:* the assumption that suitable personnel were available and motivated to carry out effective agricultural training; that the training met the needs of fishermen and farmers; and that they were incentivized to adopt new practices introduced by the extension workers (see Relevance paragraphs).
 - (iii) *Behaviour change assumption:* the assumption that producers were willing to form CBPOs (see Relevance paragraphs).
 - (iv) *Well-being assumption:* the assumption that the activities at the policy level would produce observable changes in levels of household incomes and other improvements (see Relevance paragraphs).
41. Last but not least, no activities were conducted to achieve the objective of reducing vulnerability to natural disasters.
42. **Programme implementation.** A summary of programme implementation results is provided (see annex VIII for more details).
43. **Component 1: Recovery and sustainable development of the fisheries sector.** Out of eight outcome level indicators, none were measured against the targets and are unlikely to have been achieved. Two out of three output level indicators were achieved as follows:
- (i) Output 1.1 – Establishment of four fish “markets”: Four fish “markets” were constructed by the programme in Th. Hirilandhoo, Th. Vilufushi, M. Maduvari and Ga. Gemanafushi as planned.
 - (ii) Output 1.2 – Provision of credit for ice production units: A credit facility for fish hygiene improvements (ice plants and upgrading of fishing vessels) was offered to six relatively large enterprises and state-owned companies through the Bank of Maldives. It achieved its only target.
 - (iii) Output 1.3 – Fish landing facilities in Hulhumale constructed: This was dropped in 2013 and thus failed to achieve its only target.³⁷

³⁷ Hulhumalé is an island made by reclaiming lagoon. It was developed to be temporary housing for the population displaced by the tsunami. Unfortunately, due to lack of proper infrastructure in Hulhumalé, the fish landing facility did not come to realization. Additionally, the displaced population started moving back to their own home islands as the reconstruction work started in those tsunami-affected areas (MoFA, 2017).

44. **Component 2: Recovery and sustainable development of the agriculture sector.** Out of nine outcome level indicators, none were measured against the targets. Two out of 11 output level indicators were achieved as follows:
- (i) Output 2.1 – Improvement of facilities in two agriculture centres: This failed its only target.
 - (ii) Output 2.2 – Improvement of capacities of MoFA staff in agriculture centres: This achieved one out of three targets.³⁸ Training of the facilitators was contracted to the International Center for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF). In 2010, 33 potential facilitators, 23 from the programme and 10 from the MoFA, began training. A total of 11 (eight extension workers from MoFA, and three programme staff) completed their diploma training at the G.B. Pant University in India by 2012.
 - (iii) Output 2.3 – The establishment of CBPOs: The plan was to establish 150 CBPOs by 2011. At the time of the 2013 supervision report it was reported that a total of 10 CBPOs had been formed, of which 5 were working “properly”, but these were dependent on support from the Fisheries and Agricultural Diversification Programme (FADiP).³⁹ This achieved one out of seven indicators;⁴⁰ others either failed or were not measured.
45. **Component 3: Policy support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture.** There were 13 outputs after the MTR (as shown in table 5). Out of eight outcome indicators, none was measured. Out of 15 output level indicators, six achieved the targets.

Table 5

Summary of main outputs under component 3

Output 3.1	The Fisheries Master Plan	Completed, not implemented
Output 3.2	Capacity development of MoFA/Government for regional and international cooperation	Materialized
Output 3.3	National Monitoring Control and Surveillance complying with international standards and conventions	Materialized
Output 3.4	Strengthening in the Human Resource capacity of the MFDA	Materialized
Output 3.5	Finalization of the legal revision of the fisheries bill	Not finalized
Output 3.6	Establishment and implementation of the boat building code	Not materialized
Output 3.7	Certification of Maldives fish and fisheries products from pole and line/hand line certification	Materialized
Output 3.8	Training in quality standards for traditional processing of Maldives Fish	Materialized to a very limited extent (30/200)
Output 3.9	Training and demonstration of Yellow fin longline fishing on-board the Fishing Training Centre (FTC) vessel	Materialized
Output 3.10	CBPO facilitators trained by FTC	Materialized to a very limited extent
Output 3.11	Establishment of functioning and legitimate CBPOs and working in partnership with MoFA and FTC	Not materialized
Output 3.12	Finalization of Agriculture Master Plan	Materialized by FAO
Output 3.13	MoFA staff training	Materialized

³⁸ Number of MoFA staff (men and women) trained by training service provider (target: 8 by 2009).

³⁹ The Fisheries and Agriculture Diversification Programme (FADiP) was approved by IFAD in April 2008, to be part-financed from IFAD loan 726-MV, and became effective on 15 September 2009. The total programme cost was estimated at US\$5.374 million (US\$3.5 million from IFAD, US\$546,659 from co-financers and US\$1.322 million from the government). The completion date and loan closing dates for the programme are 30 September 2014 and 31 March 2015, respectively.

⁴⁰ Number of CBPO facilitators (men and women) trained (Level 1 and 2) by training service provider (target: 25 by 2009).

Key points

- The PT-AFReP programme was designed as a response to the 2004 tsunami. The programme aimed to rehabilitate the fisheries and agriculture sectors in the Maldives and contribute to their future development.
- The programme became effective in April 2006. It was significantly changed during the MTR “revitalization” of the programme. The programme was completed on 31 December 2013, two years after the originally planned completion date.
- The initial design focused more on physical inputs – new boats, new markets, new ice plants – and less on capacity-building or training. By 2008-2009 it was clear that the original programme was unsuited to the changing context and that little progress had been made under UNOPS direct supervision. Supplemented with the change of the government, the programme underwent a revitalization process during the MTR.
- The revitalization shifted the programme’s focus from direct support to the fishery and agriculture sectors to policy support to MoFA (i.e. the share of costs for this component rose from 8.6 per cent to 32.8 per cent of the total).
- After the MTR and revitalization, the programme target area shrank from 50 to 30 agriculture islands and two of the fishery focus islands were also changed.

III. Main evaluation findings

A. Programme performance and rural poverty impact

Relevance

Relevance of objectives

46. According to the logical framework at design, the programme goals were to "contribute to the restoration of agricultural and fisheries GDP to level reached previous to the occurrence of the tsunami and return to stable and long-term growth, while improving the livelihood of affected people and reducing their vulnerability to natural disasters." The programme objectives were to: (i) "contribute to the improvement of operating conditions of the fishing fleets and increase the quality of the catches"; and (ii) "contribute to the recovery and improvement of agricultural production in the islands affected by the tsunami".
47. These objectives were originally formulated during the identification mission (February 2005) and included in the design document (July 2006). At the same time, the President's report had a set of slightly differently worded objectives. A comparison of the objectives of the different versions is provided in annex VIII. Both the design and revised logframes are used to assess the relevance of the project.
48. In general terms, these objectives were in line with the Government of Maldives's Post-Tsunami National Recovery and Reconstruction Plan and with IFAD policies as elaborated in the Framework for Bridging Post-crisis Recovery and Long-term Development (1998) and IFAD's Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2006). Both of these IFAD policy documents stress the importance of linking post-crisis relief to longer-term developmental objectives. While improving livelihoods of people affected by the tsunami, especially vulnerable rural people, would be in line with IFAD's overall objectives, the formulation of these objectives emphasized GDP restoration rather than rural livelihoods, rural poverty and the empowerment of rural people, which were much more in line with IFAD's Strategic Framework. In any case, with such a small loan amount, the objective to contribute to agricultural GDP was too ambitious.
49. The programme commenced in July 2006, 18 months after the tsunami. By then the immediate relief and rehabilitation process was over. In islands where the programme worked subsequently, informants reported that agricultural activities had returned to normal within 12 months of the tsunami. In the fisheries sector the tsunami had no appreciable impact on fish catches, the total tonnage in 2005 and 2006 being appreciably higher than in 2002-2004.⁴¹ Thus, even though the stated objectives of the programme remained constant throughout its duration, post-tsunami "recovery" became less important. Although reducing vulnerability to natural disasters remained a stated objective throughout the programme, in practice it appears that no attention was paid to this objective.
50. The result was that by the time the programme started in 2006, it had already lost its relevance to the post-tsunami recovery process. The programme was no longer concerned with "restoration" but rather with improving the livelihoods of people who had in some way been affected (and in some cases not affected) by the tsunami. At the time of the programme revitalization in 2008 this shift was recognized and the focus of activities moved towards support for rural livelihoods. However, as the Fishery Component Revitalization report pointed out, the issue in the Maldives is not so much poverty alleviation but dealing with potential poverty through ensuring the long-term sustainability of the Maldivian rural economy, especially the fishing sector.⁴²

⁴¹ Government of Maldives Fishery Statistics for 2006, Table 5.1.

⁴² See Fishery Component Revitalization report, 2009.

51. Although there was a *de facto* shift in programme objectives, no attempt was made to rewrite the original objectives. The result was that by the end of the programme there was little linkage between programme activities and outputs and the stated objectives. At programme inception these weaknesses could perhaps be seen as the result of haste to meet the aftermath of the tsunami, but by 2009 such factors were irrelevant.

Relevance of design

52. The design of the programme was poor and, as mentioned above, overly ambitious in its objectives and targeting approach. Both the original logframe and the revised version introduced in 2009 were weak in identifying objectively verifiable indicators (see below, M&E) and in identifying key risks and unreasonable assumptions. For example, the revised logframe included 63 indicators in total, and most of them were set at input and output levels. Very few of these indicators were monitored against their targets (if targets existed) during the programme's implementation.
53. As laid out in the theory of change in paragraph 41, examples of false assumptions include:
- (i) The assumption that CBPOs were viable. This persisted despite the issues raised in the 2006 appraisal report, which made it clear that there are "no indigenous roots" for such cooperative organizations in the Maldives. It was pointed out that communities were extremely wary about the possibility of cooperatives being used as rural financial intermediaries. Community activists believed that Maldivians were "very individualistic" and were "not interested in cooperatives" and that this was a top-down donor-government initiative.⁴³
 - (ii) The assumption that suitable people would be available for training and deployment as "facilitators" – "the core philosophy of the agriculture sub-component" – proved wrong.⁴⁴ Those recruited by the programme were mainly school leavers with little experience in or knowledge of agriculture, or of what their role might be (43.3 per cent were 20 years old or under). Facilitators were employed on a part-time basis and were paid between MVR 1,250 and MVR 3,000 per annum (US\$83 to US\$200) by the programme. Some facilitators indicated to the team that they had little incentive to conduct training sessions as they were neither paid nor supported by local authorities.
 - (iii) The assumption that fishers would wish to use the fish "markets". This assumption ignored the ways in which fish trading is organized in the Maldives. Most fish is sold at sea to collector vessels, with undersized fish or poor-quality fish being landed in the islands for processing. But the actual sale of fish is done before the fishing craft reach land and the "markets" do not function as sites for buying and selling, simply cutting and filleting. As pointed out by the 2008 supervision mission report, a fish market on its own has little value. After all, why try to sell fish in a small island full of fishermen?
 - (iv) The assumption that improved quality of processed fish ("Maldy fish") would generate better prices proved wrong. The main group of consumers, Sri Lankans, seem oblivious to quality issues in the case of Maldy fish.⁴⁵
 - (v) The assumption that high-value agricultural products would find a ready market in the resort islands. This assumption ignored problems with transport and with guaranteeing regular supplies. Unless production reaches a suitable and consistent level, resorts are unwilling to enter into agreements with local producers and transport costs are high as the result of uncertain demand.

⁴³ Pre-implementation report, p.16.

⁴⁴ See 2012 supervision report.

⁴⁵ Interview with Dr. S. Creech, fisheries consultant based in Colombo.

54. More rigorous analytical work at the point of revitalization and more comprehensive use of existing sources of knowledge might have prevented some of the weaker elements of the programme from going ahead.
55. Another problem is that, given the financial constraints of the project, the targeting strategy was simply too ambitious. Working with a total of 50 islands as the original design proposed, the cost would be around US\$24 per beneficiary. Given the implementation costs involved in dealing with so many scattered islands, this figure is unrealistically low.

Relevance of targeting

56. The targeting strategy was neither clear nor coherent. According to the President's report, "the agriculture islands were selected on the basis of both the level of damage caused by the tsunami and vulnerability of the rural population. Within the programme area, households selected to participate in the programme would be identified through rapid participatory assessments."⁴⁶ But project design both before and after the "revitalization" failed to specify the criteria for selecting programme sites in terms of levels of damage. Based on the PPE team's observations and conversations with the IFAD team, the programme adopted a geographical targeting approach, rather than anything related to poverty or food security criteria as claimed in the PCR. This is confirmed by the 2011 supervision report: "geographic targeting, based on tsunami-affected islands is adopted. There are no specific approaches to capture the poor or women except CBPO members are more women".
57. As far as the fishery component is concerned, the same targeting issue exists in that the criteria were not explicitly defined except for the general claim that the atolls mostly affected by the 2004 tsunami were included. This included Dhiggaru in Meemu atoll, Vilhufushi in Thaa atoll, Maamendhoo in Laamu atoll, and Maduvari⁴⁷ in Ghaaf Dhalu atoll.⁴⁸ This changed after the 2008 supervision mission: Gemanafushi and Th. Hirlandhoo were added, while Vilhufushi and Maduvari remained. The reason for this change is not documented.
58. **Overall relevance:** In summary, while the original objectives might have been relevant to the immediate post-tsunami context, the extent of alignment with IFAD's mandate and strategies is not clear (in particular with regard to the aim of contributing to restoring fishery and agricultural GDP), and the objectives were not adjusted to the changing situation. Additionally, numerous aspects in programme design and targeting were inappropriate either to disaster rehabilitation or to the long-term development context. The rating given by the Programme Management Department (PMD) is *highly satisfactory* (6), largely based on its relevance in supporting the Government of Maldives's tsunami relief efforts and programme context, without considering the technical soundness of the design and targeting. The PPE rates relevance as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3).

Effectiveness

59. Programme effectiveness is assessed by examining to what extent the intended programme objectives were achieved by the time of the evaluation. Assessing the effectiveness of this programme is challenging due to several factors:
 - (i) As indicated in the previous section, although the stated overall goal and objectives of the programme remained constant, in practice they were changed to emphasize rural livelihoods and general policy issues concerning the fisheries sector. One stated objective – reducing vulnerability to natural disasters – was simply dropped from the programme agenda. Additionally, the

⁴⁶ To this end, beneficiaries were expected to form interest groups, which would be the basis for delivery of extension services. Existing groups (e.g. women's committees) would be evaluated on their willingness and commitment to participate in programme activities (President's report, p.11).

⁴⁷ It was spelled differently in the President's report and the design reports as *Madaveli*.

⁴⁸ President's report, p.3.

objectives are mixed with impact-level effects, which will be assessed in the Rural Poverty Impact section. Thus, the evaluation chose to assess the programme by component objectives in the revised logframe (after MTR Revitalization) (see annex VIII), rather than against specific objectives.

- (ii) Poor M&E throughout the programme means that little evidence on the effectiveness of the programme during its lifetime is available. After the programme ended, there was an "Outcome Impact Survey"⁴⁹ but this gave only sketchy information about the impact of the programme or its effectiveness in achieving programme objectives.
- (iii) Many of the activities of this programme were taken over by FADiP. This means that it is difficult to disentangle the effectiveness of the activities of PT-AFRReP from those for which FADiP is responsible.

60. The result is that the data available are fragmentary and often anecdotal.

Component objective 1: "Improved and sustainable operating conditions for small and medium-scale fish harvesters and processors to maintain or improve livelihoods of island communities."

61. **Fish markets.** It was implicitly assumed that all inhabitants of an island where a "market" was constructed would benefit. But in practice the "markets" generally failed to have any major impact on the fisheries sector. Of the four constructed, only one (Maduvari) has been used for fish cutting, but at the time the team visited the site it was inactive. In another case (Gemanafushi), the structure has been modified to be used by a "cooperative" for fish processing and marketing. The upper floor is let out for commercial purposes, although there were no signs of activity when the evaluation team visited. In Gemanafushi, processors have continued to gut and cut fish in their own premises. The 2014 OIS reported that 23 per cent of the population of the island was unaware that a market existed. The other two markets present more worrisome pictures. According to the OIS, most households in Hirilandhoo and Vilufushi did not use the fish markets (88.2 per cent and 92.9 per cent, respectively). In the case of Hirilandhoo, most of the fish processors use their private jetties for landing fish, so there was no need for a fish market. And in the case of Vilufushi, the fish market was constructed in an area subject to coastal erosion and has never been used.⁵⁰ While there may be certain hygienic advantages in providing suitable facilities, it appears that only in Maduvari have people taken advantage of them.
62. In summary, it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion of the 2013 supervision report that the construction of the "markets" "has resulted in the use of funds for assets which, with the exception of the Maduvari 'market' building, may now not generate any contribution to programme outcomes." The same report remarks that it appears that the construction of these "markets" was the result of "political commitments made to communities after the tsunami and the inability/reluctance by the Government to remove this output from the Programme."
63. **Ice plants.** The support offered by the programme to finance ice plants appears to have been a successful component of the programme. In all, the programme made funds available for loan through the Bank of the Maldives for six ice plants (see annex XI).
64. The provision of these ice plants has allowed Maldivian exporters to exploit the market for high-quality fish in Europe and Japan and thus contribute to the GDP of the Maldives. The impact on fishermen is less clear, although there is evidence that

⁴⁹ Sofoora Kawsar Usman 2014.

⁵⁰ According to MoFA (2017), the market was placed in an area of erosion because originally that area was supposed to be reclaimed to minimize impact of tsunami through another financial resource. However, delays in the reclamation project ultimately compromised the fish market.

the price of fish has risen.⁵¹ However, buyers who can supply ice dominate the market. The lack of ice in small islands such as Maduvari was mentioned as a factor that reduces fish supplies for small, local fish processors. The only issue is that the project design envisaged making credit available to SMEs. In practice this seems to have been ignored given that only relatively large or state-owned companies received the credits.

65. In summary, while the programme's financial support for ice plants almost certainly benefitted the Maldivian fish industry as a whole, there is little evidence that fishers and their families directly benefitted from this activity because it is unclear how this benefit is distributed.
66. **Fishery CBPOs.** There was an attempt to establish CBPOs (see below) in the fisheries sector but this effort failed. The 2012 supervision report concluded that, "PT-AFREp has not been successful in establishing any fisheries cooperative societies" and handed over what was left to FADiP. This led to the establishment of a "cooperative" in Gemanafushi to handle the marketing of processed fish.⁵² However, of the 222 members, only 100 are processors. The other members have joined in the hope of sharing in the profits from the venture and are best seen as investors rather than members of a production or sales cooperative. The training was also limited in terms of outreach; in fact, only 157 people were trained on fish handling and fish processing for the fisheries sector.
67. Last but not least, abandonment of the fish landing facilities in Hulhumale impaired the achievement of the component effectiveness.

Component objective 2: "Improved and sustainable production practices of organized small and medium-scale agriculture producers to improve livelihoods of island communities."

68. **Agricultural CBPOs.** As has already been mentioned, the intended vehicles through which the component objective was to be achieved were CBPOs, which would function as means of training farmers, introducing new techniques and acting as conduits for both obtaining inputs and marketing outputs. By 2013 only 10 CBPOs had been formed against a target of 150. Only 5 were working "properly", but these were dependent on FADiP support.⁵³ These "successes" were involved in supplying a range of high-value crops to resort islands and were in receipt of value-chain and marketing inputs from FADiP.
69. In short, CBPOs were not a success and had limited effect on contributing sustainable agricultural production except in those few cases where support from FADiP was instrumental.
70. Facilitators were key to the agriculture component of the programme. Not only were they expected to assist in the formation of CBPOs but also to act as channels through which information and advice could be passed from the extension service to the farmers.
71. However, the quality of the facilitators was constrained by two factors: (i) poor performance in the training programme;⁵⁴ and (ii) the high attrition rate as facilitators were not interested in or suited for their roles, and were neither

⁵¹ There is a pricing policy established by the state-owned company MIFCO; the price for chilled fish is higher (MVR 19 per kilo) than for unchilled fish (MVR 17 per kilo). According to the MoFA, this pricing policy has been adopted by all fish purchasing companies.

⁵² In Gemanafushi, fish processing is carried out by Bangladeshi labour employed by processors who buy undersized fish from vessels based in the island and elsewhere.

⁵³ Supervision report 2013.

⁵⁴ Training of the facilitators was contracted to ICRAF and in 2010 33 potential facilitators, 23 from the programme and 10 from the MoFA, began training. Of these, 4 programme personnel failed Level 1, while only 16 (from both the programme and MoFA) passed level 2.

supported nor incentivized to conduct training.⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, these facilitators had a negligible impact on island agriculture. Numbers were too few to cover the islands targeted by the programme even though the number of target islands had been reduced from 50 to 30. The facilitators were mainly school leavers with little experience in or knowledge of agriculture, and were employed on a part-time basis.

72. **Agricultural training.** Besides training facilitators, the programme also supported agriculture diploma-level training for MoFA staff and certain programme staff, who then trained farmers. This training did have an impact on farmers in some of the islands. The OIS reports that the training offered by staff supported by the programme, especially in the use of composting and organic fertilizers, was well received. In all, training was supplied to 2,842 people and programme-trained MoFA staff were also available for advice on such matters as pest control. They were also responsible for the introduction of new crops in some islands (e.g. Kinbidhoo, where over 50 per cent of farmers tried new crops) although others (e.g. Fuvahmulah) rejected new crops on the basis of the risk involved.
73. It is challenging to determine the effect the programme's support to the MoFA extension service had on the livelihoods of beneficiaries in the islands targeted by the programme. It can, however, be concluded that the programme did have a positive effect on agriculture in that it encouraged the introduction of new crops and new techniques into what were already fairly sophisticated production systems using irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides. The programme would have benefitted from greater attention being paid to marketing and transport issues (topics frequently raised in the evaluation team's discussions with farmers) and the need to tailor production to the demands of the market, especially in the resort islands. These matters have been addressed by FADiP.

Component objective 3: "Enhanced human resource capacity for policy, planning and management at MoFA." In general, the programme was effective in achieving this objective.

74. In all, 13 different outputs were identified under the policy support component (see paragraph 46). Among the most effective programme interventions in this field was support to the Government of Maldives to become a full member of the IOTC, and support for the successful pursuit of MSC certification for Maldivian tuna. Membership in the IOTC has allowed the Maldives to play a full part in its deliberations and ensure that Maldivian interests are protected. MSC certification is important in ensuring access to lucrative markets across the world, especially in Europe. This was supported by the training of MFDA inspectors in order to ensure hygiene standards for exported fish.⁵⁶
75. Linked to these two broad policy initiatives was the initiation of the process of introducing vessel monitoring system (VMS) equipment to the Maldivian fishing fleet. As yet the system is still not fully operational but the basics of the system are in place and, to quote the officer in charge of this operation commenting on IFAD support, "this will be a legacy programme". Maldivian vessels are now required by law to carry vessel location devices (VLDs), although the system is still being rolled out and as yet is not comprehensive.
76. Overseas training supported by the programme resulted in six MoFA staff members being awarded degrees in relevant subjects and they are all working in the Ministry. In addition, the programme supported MoFA personnel to attend relevant

⁵⁵ In 2011 the supervision mission reported that of eight facilitators who had passed Level 2 and 5 assistant facilitators who had passed Level 1, only 6 (1 facilitator and 5 assistant facilitators) were still in post.

⁵⁶ According to the MoFA, in addition to IOTC contribution, two years contribution fee was paid from the project for the Maldives to join the Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA), which improved the human capacities of the Ministry through training and research collaboration opportunities. However, the NACA membership information was not covered by any of the project documents.

international meetings and thus broaden their experience. Those who participated in these training activities were in general very enthusiastic and positive about their experiences and the degree to which these activities had assisted them in fulfilling their professional duties.

77. Some elements of the Policy Support component were less effective. The Boat Building Code supported by the programme was not accepted by the Maldivian Transport Authority.⁵⁷ Improvements in the production of Maldy fish had little impact as the main market was uninterested in improved quality. And only after the programme ended did the planned training in longlining for yellowfin tuna get underway.⁵⁸
78. Overall, the programme did have a positive effect in terms of policy on the long-term viability of fishing in the Maldives. Here its role was primarily one of “enabling” and strengthening the capacity of the MoFA to improve its competency in fisheries management and policy determination.

Effectiveness of targeting

79. As has already been mentioned, the programme adopted a geographical targeting approach focusing on islands directly affected by the tsunami. Although the President's report envisaged that "rapid participatory assessments would be used to select households to participate in the programme", there is no evidence that this took place. The poor design of targeting led to problems in implementing the programme. Specifically, no attempt was made to deliberately target the poor within the programme islands. Without deliberate targeting, the poorest people were difficult to reach and could not benefit from programme interventions.⁵⁹
80. In addition, the failure of the programme's M&E system to collect data on poverty-related indicators of RIMS for the beneficiaries made poverty-based targeting impossible. The 2010 supervision report stated that the project had not reached many poor beneficiaries or women.
81. PMD rated the effectiveness domain as *moderately satisfactory* (4), given that "components 1 and 4 were *moderately unsatisfactory* while components 2 and 3 had *moderately satisfactory* levels of effectiveness". The PPE team considers that, although the programme was effective in some regards (e.g. the push for MSC certification, full membership in the IOTC), in other areas, particularly those which had a direct impact on rural people (e.g. CBPOs and facilitators, “markets”, agricultural production) for both agriculture and fisheries components, the programme was much less successful. Thus the PPE rating for effectiveness is *moderately unsatisfactory* (3).

Efficiency

82. **Timeline.** Considering the post-emergency context of the programme, it was slow to start up and failed to meet the immediate needs of the country. The process from the loan and grant approval to effectiveness was only slightly faster than the average programme in APR (table 6).⁶⁰ The programme was extended twice and completed on 31 December 2013, two years behind the original design.

⁵⁷ During the report review, as accepted and published in the Government Gazette on 12 January 2017 by the Maldives Transport Authority.

⁵⁸ According to the MoFA, the longline training has been carried out every year since the programme ended.

⁵⁹ Supervision report, 2013, p. 8.

⁶⁰ One caveat here is that because this was conceived as a disaster relief programme, it cannot be directly compared with more mainstream projects in APR regions.

Table 6
PT-AFReP timeline from approval to effectiveness

	<i>Approval</i>	<i>Signing</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Approval- signing (months)</i>	<i>Signing- effectiveness (months)</i>	<i>Approval- effectiveness (months)</i>
PT-AFReP	19/04/05	25/09/05	21/04/06	5.11	6.90	12.01
APR average*				4.60	8.55	13.14

Source: IFAD database Grants and Investment Programmes System.

* For programmes in APR approved between 2000 and 2007.


83. **Implementation efficiency.** The overall programme expenditure at completion showed a drawdown of 90 per cent from the original budget at design, with the actual programme cost reaching a total of US\$4.5 million compared with US\$4.99 million at appraisal. However, this level of expenditure was made without the realization of some key programme outputs (such as the construction of fish landing facilities in Hulhumale and the very poor record of training in improving traditional fish processing),⁶¹ indicating a degree of inefficiency.
84. Another issue was related to **management efficiency**: the prolonged procurement process. This was raised as an issue in various supervision reports. On average it took around eight months before an award could be given to a contractor for civil works and around four or five months to gain approval for purchasing equipment either locally or through the international market. The PIU was advised by IFAD to seek advice from the Steering Committee on how to reduce delays in procurement and finalize decisions without violating government procurement regulations and IFAD procurement guidelines.⁶² However, these issues were not resolved satisfactorily in subsequent years. The MTR also identified several delays in approvals for civil works on the part of both IFAD and the Government of Maldives tender board. These were caused in part by the large number of steps involved in the recruitment and tendering process (See annex X).
85. **Disbursement.** After the first disbursement of the authorized allocation in July 2006, there was no disbursement in the next three years. This was because expenditures had not reached the threshold of US\$80,000 required to submit the withdrawal application for replenishment of the special account. The slow disbursement rate was mainly due to three factors:
86. First, until 31 December 2007, the programme was supervised by UNOPS, during which time there were no supervision missions. This weakened programme implementation and slowed down the pace of disbursement. Both the Government of Maldives and the IFAD team in Malé stated that there was little leverage that could be brought to bear on UNOPS to speed up the programme implementation.
87. Second, start-up was delayed due to the absence of a fully staffed PIU until late 2008. Following the tsunami, the flow of aid into the Maldives was such that suitable staff were in short supply and it proved difficult to recruit a programme coordinator or other staff for the programme. The staff had other government responsibilities (e.g. the fisheries component coordinator) and, according to the 2008 supervision report, PIU staff were unable to spend sufficient time in the field. Lack of a budget line for a fully staffed PIU only exacerbated the situation.
88. Third, the change of government in 2008 had significant implications for the programme. Government priorities changed, there were important personnel changes in the government, and new forms of local government were established – Island Development Committees being replaced by Island Councils.

⁶¹ PCR, p. 6.

⁶² Supervision report, 2011, p. 2.

89. Figure 1 illustrates the slow initial disbursements of the IFAD loan up to 2009. The disbursements picked up after the programme revitalization at MTR.

Figure 1



Source: IFAD Flexcube data.

90. **Programme management cost.** The programme management cost (i.e. component 4) rose to 13 per cent of the total programme costs compared with the planned total of 2.8 per cent foreseen in the President's report. Considering that the Maldives consists of widely dispersed islands, the cost of delivering social and administrative services is inevitably higher than in most countries. The original cost estimates were overly optimistic, in part because they did not take into account the high transportation and supervision costs. Additionally, the programme was extended by two years and experienced significant changes, which also drove up management costs.
91. The relatively high turnover of programme managers and other changes in staff also negatively affected programme implementation. For example, there were three different programme managers during the life of the programme. The 2013 supervision mission noted that M&E staff turnover led to malfunctions in the management of the M&E database for two years. Compared with other countries, the Maldives is a very small island country, where capable and available personnel are scarce, and this proved to be an ongoing issue in programme implementation.⁶³
92. **Economic and financial dimensions.** The PCR did not calculate the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) at completion stage. The cost-benefit analysis at design stage only covered vessel replacement and fish markets with a 26 per cent EIRR respectively at a lower bound according to the sensitivity analysis. The EIRR was not calculated in the completion report because this was an emergency response programme.⁶⁴
93. **Cost per beneficiary.** According to the PCR, the overall cost per beneficiary is US\$735, which is calculated assuming an average household size of five.⁶⁵ As mentioned earlier, the total number of beneficiary households is 6,086. However, the PPE mission considered that the total number of beneficiaries is an over-estimate for the following reasons: (i) the "markets" have not functioned as planned (even in the island where the "market" still functions, few processors are using it); (ii) most of the CBPOs failed to function as expected and the CBPO facilitators did not deliver extension services as expected; and (iii) the programme's geographic coverage for agriculture components was reduced from 50 to 30 islands at completion.
94. **Overall,** the programme was beset by PIU budget overruns, high cost per beneficiary, significant implementation delays, and the subsequent need to extend the programme. There were also issues in making certain programme activities

⁶³ Interviews with IFAD team, PIU and different stakeholders all remarked on this point.

⁶⁴ PCR, p. 45.

⁶⁵ US\$4,473,278/6,086 households.

effective and possibly waste in the procurement process. The efficiency rating is therefore rated as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3).


Rural poverty impact

95. Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. According to the guidance of the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2005), impact will be assessed in terms of four impact domains: (i) household income and net assets; (ii) human and social capital and empowerment; (iii) food security and agricultural productivity; and (iv) institutions and policies.
96. As discussed earlier, quantitative data relating to the potential impact of the programme on rural poverty are extremely limited. This makes the assessment of the programme's poverty impact extremely problematic.
97. **Household income and net assets.** The PCR does not substantiate its claims regarding this impact domain with measurable evidence other than general statements such as: (i) the establishment of agriculture-related physical assets "has given rise to the opportunity for beneficiaries to create financial assets in the agricultural sector, through the application of enhanced knowledge of improved agricultural practices"; (ii) in M. Maduvari island, the quality of fish has improved with the use of the "fish market", which has also reduced the time prior to processing and in turn has improved the quality of fish paste (Rihaakuru), which fetches a higher price in the local market; and (iii) in N. Kendhikulhudhoo, the extension service provided by the CBPO facilitator for melon cultivation in hydroponics and other cash crops under greenhouse conditions has led to an increase in income of the beneficiary farmers.
98. OIS data suggest that the per capita monthly income within the programme area was MVR 7,534 compared with MVR 8,382 from areas outside the programme area.⁶⁶ However, this difference is not statistically significant. Without valid baseline data, it is impossible to conclude whether or not the programme contributed to changes in incomes. It was hoped that the increase of agriculture yields and fish catches and the reduction of post-harvest losses would boost household incomes. But group discussions with farmers during the field mission confirmed that marketing was a significant barrier to selling agricultural products and there were no cooperative organizations to facilitate the marketing process. Thus, even if the agricultural yield had risen, there was no evidence that this rise in cash crop production led to an increase of farmers' incomes.
99. In the Maldives as a whole, during the period of the programme, the number of fishermen declined by 22 per cent and the fish catch fell by 34 per cent. Over the same period the price of fish almost doubled and in 2011 it was estimated that the value of output per fisherman was US\$11,369. There is no evidence to indicate whether or not this picture was replicated in islands covered by the project. Even if it was, there are too many confounding factors to attribute any impact to this programme.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ The OIS survey collected data from non-programme areas, like Fuvahmulah, Guraidhoo and Kanditheemu, which provided a good opportunity to construct a comparison group.

⁶⁷ The Maldives is a small economy; the fishery industry is highly exposed to global trends in price and demand, to changes of exchange rate, and even to shipping costs. Too many confounding factors exist to give credible evidence that the changes are attributable to the IFAD programme, particularly for the impact of the policy component.

Figure 2
Estimated fisher income and revenue in Maldives (2003-2012)



Source: Höhne-Sparboth, Thomas, et.al.

100. Regarding **household assets**, although the OIS collected data at the household level,⁶⁸ the absence of baseline data means that no before/after comparison can be made. Therefore it is not possible for the PPE team to assess the impact on household assets.
101. It must be pointed out that the quality of the OIS is constrained by a number of factors: (i) the data fail to differentiate between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, thus preventing any with/without analysis; (ii) the data were not limited to the programme area (for example, 30.95 per cent of the observations were collected from Fuvahmulah, which is an island under FADiP, rather than the PT-AFReP programme); (iii) the data were poorly coded, making interpretation difficult; (iv) the discrepancy between actual population size and sample size in each island led the PPE team to conclude that a wrong sample frame was used and that it was not randomly sampled; and (v) as the baseline data were collected from secondary sources and did not focus on the beneficiaries of the programme, it is rather difficult to do a before/after analysis.⁶⁹
102. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** This impact domain concerns the changes that have occurred to human assets (nutritional status, health and education/knowledge of people), grass-roots organizations and institutions, and poor peoples' individual and collective capacities.
103. In terms of health, the construction of fish "markets" potentially provided hygienic venues for fish cleaning and gutting. Anecdotal evidence from Maduvari indicated that the incidence of diarrheal cases had dropped after the market was built. The ice plants supported with programme credit facilities allow better preservation of fish and reduction of spoilage. However, there was no quantifiable and measurable evidence found during the PPE mission.
104. In terms of education, the programme supported various forms of training in the islands, with a total of 2,842 personnel trained in the agriculture sector and 157 in the fisheries sector. However, there are no specific measurements available in the OIS on changes in human capital in terms of cognitive or non-cognitive skills.
105. In terms of building social capital, PT-AFReP supported the establishment of CBPOs through participatory community planning processes and fostered linkages among

⁶⁸ According to the OIS data, except for Hirilandhoo and Isdhoo, all households had electricity; 82 per cent of the households owned radios, in line with the comparison group; 94.5 per cent of the households had a refrigerator, higher than the national average but lower than the comparison islands. Around half of the households owned a bicycle or a cycle. Lastly, except in Gan, very few households possessed a car. But ownership of a bicycle, cycle or car might not be a good indicator for household assets, as most of the islands are rather small and so there is no need for transportation options.

⁶⁹ Lack of financial resources was commented by the OIS survey manager as a key issue preventing any high-quality data collection and analysis.

producers and government staff and actors of the value chains.⁷⁰ It was assumed that members of CBPOs would have access to information on marketing and be able to participate in collective marketing initiatives, thus giving the poor greater access to markets, which could enhance “social empowerment”.⁷¹ However, as mentioned above, the CBPOs largely failed to meet this goal and the expected increase in social capital was not realized.

106. The PCR’s reference to human and social capital and empowerment is limited only to the participation of women in the agriculture and fisheries extension, which will be covered in the Gender Equality section.
107. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** This impact domain concerns the changes in food security in terms of availability, stability and affordability. Changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields, while nutrition refers to child malnutrition and the nutritional value of food.
108. Food security is not a significant issue in the programme area. According to the PCR, only 7 out of the 420 households (1.67 per cent) surveyed in December 2013 experienced a three-month period of hunger during the preceding 12 months.
109. The programme probably had an impact on household food security but the extent cannot be assessed due to lack of evidence and data. Impact on food security was rated as *moderately unsatisfactory* (4) in the last supervision report. It was reported that programme farmers were cultivating vegetables and fruits for consumption and selling, but that volumes were insufficient to enhance direct food security, although higher incomes may have enhanced indirect food security. (Supervision report, 2013).
110. Regarding agricultural productivity, the training provided to fishermen, processors and farmers, the upgrading of fish “markets” and agriculture centres, and the provision of credit to construct ice plants have presumably contributed to reducing post-harvest losses and improving fish quality and the production and productivity of crops in the programme area. However, such contributions have not been measured.
111. In terms of agricultural productivity, analysis of the OIS data shows that 26 per cent of households have adopted new crops with the support of the project, lower than the control area’s 40.1 per cent. However, as the control area was the site of another IFAD program, FADiP, this number needs to be interpreted with caution. Group discussions with farmers confirmed that agriculture yields increased after the training sessions, but marketing was difficult as discussed above.
112. **Institutions and policies.** This impact domain concerns changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and regulatory frameworks that influence the lives of the poor. The contribution of PT-AFREp in this domain is derived from two levels: central policy and grass-roots rural institutions.
113. At the national level the programme contributed to the processes leading to MSC certification, and to the introduction of the VMS and VLD systems, which may in the long run improve marine resource management and support sustainable fishing activities in the Maldives. So does the Maldives’ accession to the IOTC in 2011.
114. While management of the fisheries has improved, in part motivated by MSC certification and IOTC membership, the fisheries still lack an integrated long-term development plan. PT-AFREp intended to support the Fishery Master Plan development and the vessel building code, but they both largely failed due to lack of an implementation plan and jurisdiction conflicts between the MoFA and the Ministry of Transport, respectively.

⁷⁰ It was reported in some supervision reports (e.g. 2010) that CBPO facilitators in some islands did convince the farmers of the benefits of group decision-making and activities.

⁷¹ Supervision report 2012, p. 17.

115. What the impact (if any) of these processes will be on rural poverty is difficult to judge. As yet there has been no evidence of impact either positive or negative, and in the long term rural poverty depends on many other factors.
116. **Summary assessment on rural poverty impact.** The impact domain most visibly affected by the programme is "institutions and policies"; other aspects show a more mixed picture. While it is possible that the programme made contributions to the household incomes of fisherman and farmers in some cases, as well as to food security and agriculture productivity, the magnitude and coverage of these contributions are not known and are probably miniscule. Thus, the overall rating for rural poverty impact, accorded by this PPE, is *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), lower than the *moderately satisfactory* (4) self-rating by the PMD.

Sustainability of benefits

117. This evaluation criterion relates to the likelihood of continuation of benefits generated by a development intervention.
118. Sustainability varies greatly between different components of the programme, and as there was relatively little interdependence between these components it is best to deal with them separately.
119. On the positive side, the success of the project in facilitating membership in the IOTC and the awarding of MSC certification is recognized by the Government of Maldives and it is committed to maintaining the membership and certification system. Support for the construction of ice plants appears to have led to a sustainable increase in ice production.
120. **Potentially sustainable** are benefits which have accrued through the support given by the programme to establish a VMS. As yet this system is not fully in place but if there is a continued commitment to the regulation of fisheries (and possibly continuing support from donors), this component could lead to sustainable gains. The PPE mission understands that there is a forthcoming World Bank fishery project and MoFA has shown interest in using this to support the expansion of VMS. Similarly, the support that was given to training for longline fishing has potentially long-term sustainable benefits.
121. **Potentially unsustainable** are most of the inputs into agricultural training. While some new crops may continue to be grown, without a major effort to resolve transport and marketing arrangements these are likely to fail in the long run.
122. **Unsustainable** are the CBPOs and associated system of facilitators. This system did not work during the lifetime of the programme. Some CBPOs were taken over by FADiP and transformed into cooperative societies. Most of these continue to rely on FADiP funding and their future is uncertain. Support for the reconstruction of the Southern Agricultural Centre also seems to have little chance of achieving long-term sustainability, at least judging by the state of the premises at the moment. There is no sign of the promised government or private funding to build classroom facilities, without which training cannot be conducted. Similarly, the "fish markets" are unsustainable, at least as fish markets. Alternative uses may be found for the buildings, and in this sense they may provide a long-term benefit for the islands – but not in the way originally conceived.
123. In terms of sustainability, although some elements do appear to be sustainable in the long run, others do not. Therefore, this domain is rated as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), compared with PMD's rating of *satisfactory* (5).

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

124. In general this was not an innovative programme. It employed well-known techniques and did little to change existing practices except at the margins (e.g. new crops, composting in the agriculture sector). The two areas which were most

innovative for the Maldivian context were the attempt to introduce CBPOs and the training in longlining. But CBPOs failed and it is too early to determine whether or not longlining will be a success in the Maldives.

125. As far as scaling up is concerned, there is little evidence that most of the activities pursued in this programme could be scaled up. However, the programme-backed introduction of VLDs and support to the VMS is likely to be extended with support from the World Bank, according to MoFA staff. The agricultural extension service could be expanded to cover more islands but funds do not seem to be available.
126. Although the programme was not expected to support innovative practices, given its post-disaster relief characteristics, it still attempted some innovative interventions, with limited success. But the few innovations documented either lack an understanding of local context or it is too early to determine their effectiveness. The scaling up of VLD devices and the MSC system are the only elements with the prospect of being scaled up through funding from other donors. Thus, the PPE rating is *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), lower than the PMD rating of *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Gender equality and women's empowerment

127. IFAD's Gender Plan of Action (2003) set as objectives: expand women's access to and control over fundamental assets – capital, land, knowledge and technologies; strengthen women's agency – their decision-making role in community affairs and representation in local institutions; and improve well-being and ease workloads by facilitating access to basic rural services and infrastructures.
128. None of these areas were directly addressed by the programme, and neither the original nor the revised logframes make any reference to gender or women. The issue of absence of gender was remarked on in the 2006 design report (the implementation version). The 2009 MTR implicitly accepts the view that gender is missing from the original policy framework. It makes the claim that the shift in emphasis towards policy and management issues will increase the salience of gender in the programme, but no evidence is brought forward to support this claim. The 2011 supervision report does mention gender but only to note how few CBPO facilitators are women despite the salience of women in the agricultural sector. The 2012 supervision report notes that there was no gender focal point or awareness of IFAD's policies on gender mainstreaming. Finally, the 2013 supervision report states that no gender sensitization had taken place as a result of the programme.
129. How many women are directly involved in agriculture is unclear. A United Nations Development Programme report quoted in the programme appraisal document claims that 85 per cent of farmers in the Maldives are women, while the 1995 census data indicate a figure of 11 per cent.⁷² Few women are employed in the primary fishery industry, as fishermen are exclusively male. More women are engaged in fish processing, both in cottage industry and industrial processing facilities. Artisanal fish smoking and drying is a small-scale industry often run as a family business in which women are centrally involved, frequently running their own business ventures. But the programme appears to have made no attempt to identify the scale of women's involvement in productive activities and the relationships between men and women more generally. The result was that there was no overall strategy to address gender issues or to "empower" women.
130. According to the PCR, women's participation in MoFA diploma and CBPO facilitator training was zero and 38 per cent, respectively, and the PCR points out that there was no support to increase women's involvement in "leadership and decision-making". In extension training, the PCR reports that over 50 per cent of the trainees were women, but given that the proportion of farmers who are women is

⁷² The same figure of 11 per cent is given in the 2014 census.

unknown, this figure is pretty meaningless. In fishing the comparative figure is 20 per cent. As far as post-harvest activities are concerned, only 32 per cent of the participants were women even though it appears that women predominate in this sector.

131. In summary, no attempt appears to have been made to mainstream gender in the programme. No activities directly targeted gender issues and programme activities tended to reproduce existing gender relations. Therefore, the programme is rated as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3) for this domain. PMD's rating was *satisfactory* (5) but the basis for this rating is not clear since the PCR does not contain any specific section discussing this criterion and has only a couple of sentences scattered in different parts of the report to address it.

Environment and natural resources management

132. This evaluation criterion assesses the extent to which a programme contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment.
133. A major thrust of this programme concerned the management of aquatic resources and as such it can be seen as generally favourable to the long-term sustainable management of Maldivian natural resources. Support for MSC certification demands sustainable use of resources. Membership in the IOTC brings the Maldives into the wider arena of protecting and managing resources in the Indian Ocean.
134. In addition, the Monitoring Control and Surveillance system and VLDs potentially strengthen the government's management of its marine resources to minimize illegal fishery activities and promote its adherence to socially and environmentally responsible fishery methods.
135. As far as agriculture is concerned, the programme encouraged the use of composting and organic fertilizers. Additionally, the programme has supported improved agricultural practices including soil and moisture conservation, biological pest control and organic agriculture. On a limited scale, these have brought about a positive contribution to natural resources management.⁷³
136. More generally, no attempt was made to track the environmental impacts of the programme or to consider how the programme might reduce the impact of fishing and agriculture on the natural environment. So, for instance, the programme did not support initiatives to use solar power to replace petroleum-based products or to replace or at least complement the use of wood in fish processing.
137. In summary, considering the government's policy in adopting MSC certification and VLD/VMS management system, which significantly promoted pole and line fishing and sustainable marine environment management, this domain can be rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4), the same as the PMD's rating.

Adaptation to climate change

138. This evaluation criterion concerns the contribution of the programme to increasing climate resilience and beneficiaries' capacity to manage short- and long-term climate risks. The Maldives is particularly vulnerable to the expected adverse consequences of climate change, such as a rise in sea level, increases in sea surface temperature, ocean acidification and the frequency and intensity of droughts and storms.⁷⁴ In this programme, no consideration was taken of the possible effects of climate change and sea level changes on the Maldives. For example, the 2013 supervision mission report indicated that programme design did not provide for any specific activities aimed at addressing either climate change resilience through adaptation, or climate change mitigation – i.e. reduced contributions to climate change (p.9). If the original objective of reducing people's

⁷³ Supervision report 2013, p.9.

⁷⁴ World Bank, 2013: The Maldives: A Development Success Story.

vulnerability to natural disasters had been maintained, issues concerning climate change could have been addressed.

139. Even though climate change was not an issue in the IFAD agenda when the programme was originally conceived, by the time of the “revitalization” and associated restructuring of the programme such issues were of interest to IFAD, and given the vulnerability of the islands to climate change, such issues should have been addressed. For example, the programme could have implemented coastal zone planting (e.g. mangrove and salt marsh vegetation) and some other measures to prevent flooding and coastal erosion. Given that no attention was given to this dimension at all, the rating is *unsatisfactory* (2), compared with PMD's rating of *moderately satisfactory* (4).

C. Overall programme achievement

140. What is striking about this programme is that, although the stated objectives were concerned with the rehabilitation of the fisheries and agriculture sector in the Maldives and originally stressed a series of physical outputs (new boats, “markets”, ice plants), the greatest achievements are concerned with policy and the overall environment of the fishery sector.
141. Gaining full membership in the IOTC was a major achievement. Without full membership, the Maldives would be unable to directly influence policies concerning fishing which have a direct impact on the economic well-being of the country as a whole. The support supplied by the programme for MoFA personnel to gain experience participating in international fora and the financial support for initial membership payments to the IOTC were crucial in this context.
142. The second major achievement was gaining MSC certification for pole- and line-caught skipjack tuna. The support supplied by the programme allowed Maldivian personnel to gain experience and knowledge of what was required to gain this certification. The result is that Maldivian fish commands a premium price in some of the major markets (e.g. Europe, particularly the United Kingdom), thus benefitting the Maldivian economy as a whole. More importantly, MSC certification is also a marker that environmental issues concerning the long-term sustainability of the fishery are being addressed and taken seriously.
143. The third major achievement is assistance in building human capacity in the Maldivian fisheries and agriculture sectors. Training at degree level and diploma level, plus a series of short courses, were all well received by those who participated. The result is a more technically proficient MoFA.
144. Other achievements are less significant. The six ice plants that received financial support from IFAD are clearly useful to the organizations/companies. But if the ice plants were economically viable they would probably have been constructed anyway. The VMS has the potential to be extremely important but this programme's achievement is limited to initiating the installation of the necessary equipment.
145. As far as other activities and outputs are concerned, the level of achievement is low. The “markets” are in general unused and have little impact on the fishing industry. Various forms of training (longlining, improved fish curing techniques) have so far shown little result. Support in the agricultural sector has had a very limited impact.
146. Given the variability in performance across the programme, and the failure of the programme to have much impact on the livelihoods of rural people, the PPE rates the overall performance as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), compared with PMD's rating of *moderately satisfactory* (4). There were some elements that will be of lasting benefit to the Maldives as a whole, but in terms of IFAD's mission the programme failed to have much success at the rural level.

D. Performance of partners

IFAD

147. IFAD's performance was mixed. At the planning stage IFAD recognized that it was not a relief agency and should delay its involvement until the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase of the post-disaster cycle. It also sensibly recognized at the planning stage that flexibility had to be built into programme design given the uncertainties of any rehabilitation process.
148. UNOPS supervised the programme implementation from 2006 to 2008, during which no supervision missions were conducted. The programme then came under the direct supervision of IFAD through the MTR and a series of annual supervision missions. Flexibility was important in allowing the programme and IFAD to respond to the changing policy environment of the Maldives and, although this is less clearly documented, to the activities of other agencies such as FAO, ADB and the United Nations Development Programme. In addition, at a later stage of implementation, IFAD was able to address some key programme management issues: lack of field visits by PIU staff; poor contribution of the component coordinators to programme implementation; PIU staff's unsatisfactory performance on contracts (working time, pensions, exchange rate adjustments, etc.); and lack of clarity of staff duties and reporting responsibilities.⁷⁵ However, these remedial measures came only one year before programme completion, after most of the outputs had been delivered.
149. At the same time, there were two areas where IFAD could have performed better. First, at the revitalization stage of the programme, when it was clear that a major restructuring was necessary, IFAD failed to carry out a comprehensive revision and re-planning of the programme. The result was that there was little linkage between programme activities and programme objectives and no clear rationale to the programme as a whole. At the same time, IFAD allowed certain components to proceed even though grave doubts were expressed at various stages as to their viability. This was particularly marked in the case of the "markets", where the incoming government felt that it could not pull back on undertakings. Similarly, the drive behind the push for CBPOs was the result of a commitment by both the government and IFAD to support the establishment of rural collectives, despite various warnings being given in earlier documents as to their viability.
150. A second area where IFAD's performance was lacking is in M&E. Even though M&E is mainly the government's responsibility, IFAD could have played a more proactive role in supporting the improvement of the M&E system design to ensure that reporting went beyond outputs, with SMART⁷⁶ indicators and targets set at the point of revitalization, if not before. The M&E system was overly focused on outputs with little analysis of outcomes (e.g. M&E did not collect any adequate information on post-harvest losses, the amount of fish which passed through the "markets", the adoption rate of new agricultural techniques or targeting data on agriculture productivity). This was a continual issue remarked upon by successive supervision missions. Not only did this failure hamper programme management, but it also prevents any clear understanding of the impact of the programme as a whole. In part this may be the result of a lack of suitable personnel in the Maldives, but even so this issue was not adequately addressed by IFAD – for instance, through providing technical and capacity-building assistance.
151. Overall, the programme started with a weak design structure. IFAD, perhaps belatedly, tried to resolve and adapt to the changing context and country needs. Even then, there were a number of serious flaws in design and implementation that were not resolved by the end of the project cycle and for which IFAD has to be held at least partly accountable (e.g. constructing "markets", supporting the CBPOs).

⁷⁵ Supervision report (2012).

⁷⁶ SMART stands for specific, measurable, assignable, realistic and time-related.

Thus, the performance of IFAD is rated as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), lower than PMD's rating of *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Government

152. The implementing agency was the MFAMR which, after the change of government in 2008, was retitled the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture (MoFA). In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the pressures on the Ministry were immense, not only having to manage a sizeable proportion of the relief and rehabilitation activities in the Maldives but also to liaise with a string of foreign agencies. It is not surprising that so little happened in this programme given these pressures, and that staff were assigned to the programme only on a part-time basis.
153. After the "revitalization" in 2008-2009, MoFA's performance was generally satisfactory. One of the major issues faced was reacting to and implementing changing government policies after the 2008 election. This involved MoFA negotiating changes to certain components in the programme (e.g. construction of boats, financing of ice plants), a process that went relatively smoothly. However, MoFA's commitment to the construction of the "markets" resulted in a wasteful investment. The Ministry's commitment to Maldivian membership in the IOTC and MSC certification were important elements in the success of these components of the project. MoFA was also responsible for selecting trainees at various levels and this seems to have been generally successful. Most of those whose training was supported by the programme are still in post, with the exception of the facilitators. The Programme Steering Committee met at least three times a year to discuss and resolve emerging issues facing the programme,⁷⁷ which showed commitment from the government side as well.
154. There were, however, aspects of the programme where the performance of the Ministry was less satisfactory. This is evident in two of the training centres. The Agricultural Centre in Gan, in part supported by the programme, is still not in operation, over three years after the end of the programme. This appears to be the result of financial constraints and uncertainties over the management of the centre. At the Fisheries Training Centre, the failure of the Ministry to supply a suitable boat seriously delayed training in longline fishing.⁷⁸ The government did not conduct the baseline survey until the MTR, four years after the programme was approved, and the survey failed to collect programme area level data, which prevented assessments of impact. The M&E system was not properly established and functioned poorly. Finally, the decision-making process was often slow, which led to delays in programme implementation. As mentioned in the Efficiency section of this report, delays in the procurement process hampered programme implementation. These issues were raised by a number of supervision missions, but MoFA appears to have lacked effectiveness in resolving such issues.⁷⁹ For example, it was stated in the 2012 supervision mission that the lack of firm decision-making by MoFA senior staff was the main reason for procurement delays.
155. As with IFAD, the performance of the Government of Maldives is rated to be *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), lower than PMD's rating as *satisfactory* (5).

E. Assessment of the quality of the project completion report

156. **Scope.** The PCR by and large covers most of the evaluation criteria, albeit often with insufficient detail and depth. The only evaluation criteria completely missing are climate change adaptation and gender. More attention is given to component outputs and outcomes. The PCR itself is rather concise. The scope of the PCR is therefore rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4).

⁷⁷ Supervision report (2011).

⁷⁸ PCR, p. 8.

⁷⁹ In addition MoFA took almost a year to complete the second subsidiary loan agreement, which enables the operation of additional credit funds of US\$400,000 for ice plants and US\$100,000 for farmers (supervision report, 2013).

157. **Quality (methods, data, participatory process).** The PCR contains various cases of inconsistent and missing data with regard to beneficiaries, outcomes and impacts. It also does not provide sufficient analytical depth to better understand the complicated challenges this programme was facing in the post-tsunami context. The figures and tables were not properly labelled or explained, which created some puzzling issues. Some sections are poorly analysed and contain irrelevant information and evidence. For example, under *food security and agricultural productivity*, drinking water quality was discussed, which is not related to the programme. Clearer explanations of what changes were made to the different components throughout the project cycle would be desirable. The rating is *moderately unsatisfactory* (3).
158. **Lessons.** The lessons learned that are included in the PCR are useful. They concentrate on operational issues, such as M&E system-building, data record-keeping, knowledge handover and the sequence of programme implementation. But insufficient attention is given to programme design and restructuring, as well as to how implementation mechanisms (e.g. funding, institutional set-up) could be tailored to the post-disaster context (e.g. coordination with partners, adaption to the fast-changing context), which could have been important to IFAD's learning. The rating is *moderately satisfactory* (4).
159. **Candour.** The PCR tried to keep a balance between programme achievements and setbacks. However, in the opinion of the PPE mission, some statements are misleading. For example, the PCR claims that a training venue had been constructed at L. Gan, the site of the Southern Agriculture Centre. This mission only saw an accommodation bloc, little more having been constructed. Similarly, the PCR overstates the performance and utility of the CBPOs. The rating is *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Key points

- The programme objectives included both recovery and developmental aspects. Although there was a *de facto* shift in programme objectives, no attempt was made to rewrite the original objectives. The result was that by the end of the programme there was little linkage between programme activities and outputs and stated objectives.
- The programme intervention logic (i.e. the logframe) was unclear. The design was based on a series of false assumptions, which the programme did not properly address during the revitalization and following implementation.
- The implementation of the fishery component had mixed success. The “markets” failed to have any major impact on the fishery sector as they were either underused or badly located and did not function as markets. The credit supplied to construct ice plants helped exporters exploit the market for high-quality fish, but this credit did not assist SMEs.
- The design and implementation of CBPOs were weak. This was partly a matter of poor definition (i.e. whether they were concerned with extension, marketing, or production services, and how should they be constituted), failure to establish a competent cadre of facilitators, and the lack of “indigenous roots” for such organizations in the Maldives.
- Efficiency was impaired by the prolonged procurement process, low management efficiency, slow disbursement, and the probable increased cost per direct beneficiary. Ninety per cent of the original budget has been disbursed without the realization of some key programme outputs (e.g. fish landing facilities in Hulhumale, poor record of training.)
- The slow disbursement before the MTR was mainly due to three factors: (i) direct supervision under UNOPS when no disbursements were made for two years and no supervision mission conducted; (ii) absence of a fully staffed PIU until late 2008; and (iii) the change of government at the central level and resulting changes in administration at the island level. After the MTR, the disbursement rate picked up.
- The impact domain most visibly affected by the programme is “institutions and policies”; other aspects show a more mixed picture. However, there is almost no measurable evidence due to poor performance in M&E and the OIS, which prevented any before/after or with/without analysis.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

160. **Overall, IFAD's decision to design and finance the programme was partly due to political pressure to act quickly in the face of an unprecedented disaster. This led to poor initial design.** PT-AFReP was initiated against the background of IFAD approving four loans to countries affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. Although the programme was planned in haste, it was recognized that flexibility was essential, given the changing nature of the situation. As originally planned, the major focus of activities was on physical inputs and less on capacity-building or training.
161. **Little progress was made in the early years of the programme. By the time of the MTR it was clear that the PT-AFReP as originally designed was only partially relevant to the country's needs.** This was the result of political changes in the Maldives, the activities of other donors and agencies which made redundant some of the planned activities of IFAD, and a realization that some of the original planned activities were misconceived. The result was a major shift of focus in the programme away from physical investments towards building human capacity in MoFA and technical assistance at the Ministry level.
162. **The programme could have been revitalized in a more systematic way with effective programme planning and clear intervention logic.** However, opportunities were missed. Although there was a wholesale set of changes in the components of the programme there was no systematic reconsideration of the overall objectives and purposes of the programme. The result was a series of discrete activities only loosely related to each other without a clear logic or theory of change linking them together. The design issues and continuous changes in implementation affected planning and severely limited the effectiveness of the programme.
163. **As a result, the programme was most effective at national policy level with regard to sustainable fishing, but it is rather difficult to measure any effect at ground level.** There were some major successes concerning sustainable fishing – for instance, membership in the IOTC and MSC certification for pole- and line-caught fish. However, in terms of IFAD's remit to address poverty issues in rural communities, it is not clear that these components of the programme had any direct effect.
164. **A specific targeting strategy and identification of the intended beneficiaries were lacking, which meant that the programme failed to reach rural vulnerable populations, including women.** The geographical focus adopted in the early stages of the programme is understandable. Although mention was made in the President's report that the programme would benefit poor people, no attempt was made at the point of revitalization to identify who these people were, what poverty means in the Maldives, and most importantly of all, what the processes are that generate poverty or vulnerability, and how these might be effectively addressed by the programme. This could have been better addressed at the MTR stage. Moreover, the project did not include a gender mainstreaming strategy at design, thus neglecting the important role that women play in fishery and agricultural activities.
165. **The lack of any effective monitoring system made programme management difficult and led to problems in measuring effectiveness and impact during and after the programme.** Although financial flows were monitored, only a limited attempt was made to monitor what the programme was or was not achieving in the various islands in which it worked. The M&E design only focused on input and output levels indicators – few indicators were SMART – nor

were targets set up to map programme progress. All of these significantly weakened the measurement of programme effectiveness and poverty impact.

B. Recommendations

166. **Recommendation 1. In post-disaster situations, IFAD should not focus on immediate disaster relief, but rather on “initiatives that help bridge the gap between emergency relief and the restoration of the development process”.** IFAD's internal structure and financial instrument is not geared towards rapid response and/or post-disaster operations. The danger is that relief considerations may outweigh developmentally oriented activities to the detriment of the latter. A stress on speed of reaction can lead to poorly designed projects or programmes, thus the *ex-ante* quality assurance procedures within IFAD should not be waived. Additionally, the loan format is probably not suited to quick responses in emergency situations but rather to later phases in the recovery process. Countries in post-disaster context tend to have lower absorptive capacities for finances from various international players, and a later engagement could also ensure the counterparts have better absorptive capacities.
167. **Recommendation 2. In the recovery process, the design should address long-term goals rather than short-term needs, with a demand-driven participatory approach and technical assessment to prevent underuse and inefficient investments.** This requires an analytical approach focusing on the processes which give rise to constraints and issues preventing sustainable agricultural and fishery development. These are essential as the basis for an effective and relevant theory of change. What has to be avoided is an approach which is dependent on the preconceived ideas of both donors and recipients without proper consideration of local needs and community context
168. **Recommendation 3. A targeting strategy must be developed and implemented in a systematic way based on sound technical justifications.** This requires both a clear impact pathway (i.e. theory of change) and solid baseline information to identify the intended beneficiary groups/geographic areas at programme design stage. The information could be obtained either from a baseline survey or from secondary data sources disaggregated at lower administrative units. A poverty index and a specific need index could be combined for such a targeting strategy to ensure that programme investment is utilized wisely. Additionally, any construction work should also take into account its catchment effect and utilization rate for the intended beneficiaries. An outreach and awareness-raising strategy should also be considered to reach the marginalized beneficiaries, rather than a passive approach of waiting for them to join.
169. **Recommendation 4. There must be sufficient investment and support to capacity-building to ensure effective M&E systems, analytical studies and documentation.** As far as M&E is concerned, the focus should be on the outcome and impact levels as well as the input and output levels. Similarly, there should be sufficient financial and human resources to support essential studies and surveys as needed. These data and the material available from effective M&E are an essential basis for project implementation and policy development.
170. **Recommendation 5. Gender equality and women's empowerment should be supported with a more systematic approach.** This approach should not be confined only to collecting gender-disaggregated data; a gender-sensitive poverty and livelihoods analysis should be conducted. This is essential for fishery programmes, in which men tend to be the primary beneficiaries while women's roles are limited to fish processing. In order to mainstream women's participation, the design needs to include supports to fish processing and other activities, in which women also participate. Training should also be customized to the special needs of women, with regard to location, timing and manner of delivery.

Basic programme data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	Asia and the Pacific	Total programme costs	4 988		4 473	
Country	Maldives	IFAD loan and percentage of total	4 095	82.1%	4 058	90.7%
Loan number	663-MV; 692-MV Grant: 783-MV	IFAD grant	0.20	4.0%	0.20	99%
Type of programme (subsector)	Fisheries	Italian grant	0.5	10.0%	0.0	0%
Financing type	Loan and Grant	Borrower	0.193	3.9%	0.215	4.8%
Lending terms*	Highly Concessional	Beneficiaries	0.0	0%	0	0
Date of approval	19/04/2005	Cofinancier 4				
Date of loan signature	25/09/2005	Beneficiaries				
Date of effectiveness	21/04/2006	Other sources				
Loan amendments	663-MV (6 times) 783-MV (one time) 692-MV (one time)	Number of beneficiaries: (if appropriate, specify if direct or indirect)	8 145 for fishery 50 islands for agriculture		6 080 households	
Loan closure extensions	2					
Country programme managers	Hubert Boirard (current) Ya Tian Sana Jatta Ariko Toda	Loan closing date	31/12/2011		30/06/2014	
Regional director(s)	Hoonae Kim	Mid-term review			21/03/2009	
Lead evaluator for programme performance evaluation	Shijie Yang	IFAD loan disbursement at programme completion (%)			99%	
Programme performance evaluation quality control panel	Simona Somma Michael Carbon	Date of programme completion report			31/10/2016	

Source: President's report; project appraisal report; project completion report; project supervision ratings; PeopleSoft Financials.

* There are four types of lending terms: (i) special loans on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years; (ii) loans on hardened terms, bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of 10 years; (iii) loans on intermediate terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to 50 per cent of the variable reference interest rate and a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of five years; (iv) loans on ordinary terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to one hundred per cent (100%) of the variable reference interest rate, and a maturity period of 15-18 years, including a grace period of three years.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Programme performance	Programme performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of programme design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the programme's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies. 	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the programme to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall programme achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to programme design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the programme life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Programme Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>Programme Performance Evaluation rating</i>	<i>Rating disconnect</i>
Rural poverty impact	4	3	-1
Programme performance			
Relevance	6	3	-3
Effectiveness	4	3	-1
Efficiency	4	3	-1
Sustainability of benefits	5	3	-2
Programme performance^b	4.75	3	-1.75
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	3	-2
Innovation and scaling up	4	3	-1
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	2	-2
Overall programme achievement^c	4	3	-1
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	4	3	-1
Government	5	3	-2
Average net disconnect			-1.45

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the programme, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall programme achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Scope	N/A	4	N/A
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	N/A	3	N/A
Lessons	N/A	4	N/A
Candour	N/A	4	N/A
Overall rating of the project completion report	N/A	4	N/A

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.a. = not applicable.

Approach paper

Background

1. For completed investment projects financed by IFAD, its Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) undertakes: (i) validation of project completion reports (PCRs) for all projects, based on a desk review of project completion reports (PCRs) and other documents; and (ii) project performance evaluations (PPEs) involving country visits for a number of selected projects (about 10 in a given year).¹
2. A PPE is conducted after a desk review of the PCR and other available documents, with the aim of providing additional evidence on project achievements and validating the conclusions of the PCR. In general terms, the main objectives of PPEs are to: (i) assess the results of the project; (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in the country; and (iii) identify issues of corporate, operational or strategic interest that merit further evaluative work.
3. The Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme (PT-AFREP) in the Republic of Maldives (implemented between 2005 and 2013) has been selected for a project performance evaluation. The Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme (PT-AFREP) in the Republic of Maldives (implemented between 2005 and 2013) has been selected for a project performance evaluation in 2016. The PPE is expected to further contribute to an IOE Evaluation Synthesis report on fisheries, aquaculture and coastal areas development.

Programme overview

4. **Programme area.** The original programme area for fishery activities included four fishery islands affected by the tsunami: Dhiggaru in Meemu atoll; Vilhufushi in Thaa atoll; Maamendhoo in Laamu atoll; and Madaveli in Ghaaf Dhalu atoll, with a **total population of 8,145**, which would benefit from improved fish handling facilities. About 150 fishers were to receive new vessels. Fishing communities in which inhabitants of tsunami-affected islands were resettled would also benefit from the programme.
5. Regarding the agriculture activities, the original programme aimed to cover 50 tsunami-affected islands. Among those islands, the MFAMR identified 26 most eligible islands as the **primary target area**, the selection based upon both the level of damage caused by the tsunami and the vulnerability of the rural population. The **second group** of 24 islands to be assisted would be selected by the MFAMR during implementation of the programme, based on: (a) agricultural importance; (b) incidence of poverty and vulnerability; and (c) levels of food insecurity. However, after the project revitalization in 2009-2010, the revised geographical area in which to implement the revitalized agriculture component consisted of 30 islands, instead of the original 50 tsunami affected islands.²
6. At the end, the project had reached 6,086 households. No poverty prevalence data were provided for the programme area as the programme was primarily concerned with post-disaster rehabilitation.
7. **Programme objectives.** The overall goal of the programme was to contribute to restoring agricultural gross domestic product to pre-tsunami levels, returning the economy to a stable, long-term growth trend and reducing the fishery sector's

¹ The selection criteria for PPE include: (i) information gaps in PCRs; (ii) projects of strategic relevance that offer enhanced opportunities for learning; (iii) a need to build evidence for forthcoming corporate level evaluations, country strategy and programme evaluations or evaluation synthesis reports; and (iv) a regional balance of IOE's evaluation programme.

² The supervision report also stated a conflicting number of 25 islands on the same page. supervision report, p.73, 2013.

vulnerability to natural disasters. Specifically, it aimed to help re-establish the country's fishing operations and augment the household income of fishers by restoring their livelihoods. With regard to agriculture, the programme aimed to encourage crop production in the atolls so as to rebuild the islanders' livelihoods and improve their diet, increase household income, reduce poverty and ensure food security.

8. **Target group and targeting approach.** Overall the programme was aimed at poor households and adopted a geographical targeting approach. The **primary target group** for the agricultural component comprises poor farming households that depended on subsistence agriculture for food and income, and whose crops and production assets were destroyed/damaged by the tsunami. It was estimated that 5,000 households (or 20,000 beneficiaries) living in an area of approximately 1,000 ha would be assisted.³
9. **Programme components.** The programme was organized around four main components as follows:
 - (i) **Recovery and sustainable development of the fisheries sector.** This component consisted of three sub-components: (a) support to fisheries production; (b) fish marketing; and (c) training and extension. About 40 per cent of the total programme cost was spent on this component and an equivalent proportion of the IFAD loan was allocated to associated credit lines, compared with 65 per cent at design stage (as table 1 shows).
 - (ii) **Recovery and sustainable development of the agricultural sector.** This component involved four sub-components: (a) agricultural marketing; (b) adaptive research and agricultural extension; (c) strengthening the capacity of the Agriculture Centers; and (d) community farmers' organizations.⁴ At the design stage it was estimated that this component would cost 23.2 per cent of the overall budget. This had fallen to 15.9 per cent at project completion.
 - (iii) **Policy support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture.** Five sub-components were planned: (a) capacity building of MoFA staff; (b) strengthening of fisheries regulatory services; (c) diversification of capture fisheries; (d) organising the fisheries sector; and (e) follow-up implementation of the Agricultural Master Plan. These components were to consist of senior staff training, international visits, national workshops, consultancies and studies. Project costs attributed to this component rose from 8.6 per cent at design to 32.8 per cent at completion.
 - (iv) **Programme coordination.** The programme coordination component included the establishment of PIU within MoFA, as well as staff training in procurement, audits, programme management and monitoring, preparation of reports and consultancies. The cost for this component rose from 2.8 per cent to 12 per cent.

Table 1 shows the financial weight attributed to each component.
10. **Project financing.** The sources of programme funds are shown in table 2. According to the PCR, the disbursement of the SDR 1.4 million IFAD loan 663-MV was 99.91 per cent, the disbursement of the SDR 1.45 million IFAD loan 692-MV was 81.07 per cent and the disbursement of the IFAD grant was 99.74 per cent. The Italian grant did not materialize.⁵ The Government's actual cost amounted to 111.4 per cent of the estimated contribution at appraisal.

³ With the reduction of the programme area for agriculture activities, the number of primary target groups was also reduced.

⁴ This sub-component did not exist until the mid-term review and revitalization of the project.

⁵ The team will identify the reasons behind the cancellation of the Italian grant.

Table 1
Planned and actual programme financing by component (US\$ '000)

<i>Component</i>	<i>Appraisal budget</i>		<i>Disbursed</i>	
	<i>US\$</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>US\$</i>	<i>%</i>
A. Recovery and sustainable development of the fisheries sector	3 131	65.4	1 758.8	39.3
B. Recovery and sustainable development of the agriculture sector	1 111	23.2	710.4	15.9
C. Policy support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture	413.2	8.6	1 465.2	32.8
D. Programme coordination	132.6	2.8	538.9	12.0
Total	4 988.3	100	4 473.3	100

Table 2
Sources of programme funds (US\$ '000)

<i>Financier</i>	<i>Appraisal</i>		<i>Disbursed</i>	
	<i>US\$</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>US\$</i>	<i>%</i>
IFAD loan	4 095	82.1	4 058	90.7
IFAD grant	200	4.0	200	4.5
Italian grant	500	10.0	0.0	0.0
Government	193	3.9	215	4.8
Beneficiaries	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	4 988	100	4 473	100

Notes: The IFAD budget is composed of three parts: a) loan number 663-MV (SDR 1,400,000, approximately equivalent to US\$ 2,100,000); b) Grant number 783-MV (SDR 140,000, approximately equivalent to US\$210,000), Effective date 30 June 2006; c) loan number 692 – MV (SDR 1,450,000, approximately equivalent to US\$2,175,000), Effective Date 12th October 2006.

11. **Timeframe.** The initial IFAD loan (663-MV, US\$2.048 million) and grant (783-MV, US\$200,000) was approved on 19 April 2005 and became effective on 21 April 2006. The second loan (loan 692-MV) for the same programme was approved in September 2005. The programme was completed on 31 December 2013, two years behind the original design.
12. **Implementation arrangements.** The MFAMR was the lead implementing agency. The programme was implemented as part of the Government's Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Programme, under the supervision of an independent steering committee comprising representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Treasury, Atoll Development, National Planning, and MFAMR, and of private-sector organizations. A programme implementation unit was set up in the MFAMR, to oversee the implementation of the project. The fisheries component was managed by the Director of Fisheries and Marine Resources; the agriculture component was managed, at the central level, by the Director of Agriculture and Forestry Services and, at each agriculture centre, by an agricultural officer.
13. **Supervision arrangements.** Initially, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was appointed as a cooperating institution responsible for administering the financing and supervising the programme (as per the president report and loan agreement dated on June 2006), during which no supervision mission was undertaken. However, with the overall corporate shift to direct supervision, IFAD took over the direct supervision of the project effective from 1 January 2008, with the first supervision visit in November 2008.
14. **Adjustments during implementation.** According to the pre-implementation design report, flexibility was built into the programme to allow adjustment to the

rapid evolving (aid) situation.⁶ Whilst the four major components of the programme remained constant, the mid-term review (MTR) in 2009 led to major changes in the nature of the various sub-components. For example, under the Fisheries component, the first sub-component concerned with replacing fishing vessels and equipping them with fish-storage facilities was dropped and funds reallocated to other activities. Another new sub-component involved a credit facility for fish hygiene improvements (ice plants and upgrading of fishing vessels) being offered to small and medium scale enterprises. More generally, the 'revitalization process' after the MTR laid much more stress on institution and capacity building activities compared with the original programme design. There were similar modifications to the agricultural component of the programme. So for instance under the Agriculture component's sub-component of agriculture marketing, the original plan of upgrading/establishing a new fresh-produce market in Malé was dropped, with the funds reallocated to other activities, in particular support for local level producers' cooperatives. Furthermore, the project area was also revised (see paragraph 4).

15. **Amendments to the financing agreement.** The financing agreement was amended six times for loan No. 663-MV and grant No. 783-MV and one time for loan No. 692-MV: (i) reflecting changes made for supervision arrangement from UNOPS to IFAD's direct supervision (22 March 2008); (ii) revision on Procurement Guidelines (4 February 2009) (iii) revisions made during the mid-term review to the fisheries and agriculture component activities, as well as programme area (i.e. Revitalization Plan) (7 September 2009); (iv) increase of the authorized ceiling, modification of the disbursement condition, and modification of the composition of the steering committee (2 October 2010); and (v) loan reallocation and extension (22 December 2011 and 14 November 2012).⁷

PPE scope and methodology

16. The PPE exercise will be undertaken in accordance with the IFAD's Evaluation Policy⁸ and the IFAD Evaluation Manual (second edition, 2015). Analysis in the PPE will be assisted by a review of the theory of change of the project.
17. **Scope.** In view of the time and resources available, the PPE is generally not expected to undertake quantitative surveys or to examine the full spectrum of project activities, achievements and drawbacks. Rather, it will focus on selected key issues. The PPE will take account of the preliminary findings from a desk review of PCR and other key project documents and interviews at the IFAD headquarters. During the PPE mission, additional evidence and data will be collected to verify available information and each an independent assessment of performance and results.
18. **Evaluation criteria.** In line with the IOE's Evaluation Manual (2015), the key evaluation criteria applied in PPEs in principle include the following:
- (i) **Rural poverty impact**, which is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a results of development interventions. Four impact domains are employed to generate a composite indication of rural poverty impact: (i) household income and assets; (ii) human and social capital and empowerment; (iii) food security and

⁶ As a result of the urgency of the situation, the normal IFAD three staged design phase, comprising inception, formulation, and appraisal missions, was not completed. Instead a single design mission visited the country. Thus, there was not enough time before the approval of the programme by IFAD in April 2005 for thorough consultations with the Government of the Maldives concerning the design of its components and activities. Consequently, the programme was approved during the internal review process of IFAD with provisions for an in-built flexibility during its implementation. In particular, the Technical Review Committee of IFAD requested that a pre-implementation mission be undertaken soon after the programme was declared effective, in order to "adjust the design to the rapidly evolving (aid) situation, as well as to fill design gaps." (p. 1).

⁷ The loan extension has also been made to the loan No. 692-MV.

⁸ <http://www.ifad.org/pub/policy/oe.pdf>.

agricultural productivity; and (iv) institutions and policies. A composite rating will be provided for the criterion of "rural poverty impact" but not for each of the impact domains.

- (ii) **Relevance**,⁹ which is assessed both in terms of alignment of project objectives with country and IFAD policies for agriculture and rural development and the needs of the rural poor, as well as project design features geared to the achievement of project objectives.
 - (iii) **Effectiveness**, which measures the extent to which the project's immediate objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
 - (iv) **Efficiency**, which indicates how economically resources/inputs (e.g. funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
 - (v) **Sustainability of benefits**, indicating the likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
 - (vi) **Gender equality and women's empowerment**, indicating the extent to which IFAD's interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making work loan balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.
 - (vii) **Innovation and scaling up**, assessing the extent to which IFAD development interventions: (a) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (b) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and other agencies.
 - (viii) **Environment and natural resource management**, assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resource and the environment.
 - (ix) **Adaptation to climate change**, assessing the contribution of the project to increase climate resilience and increase beneficiaries' capacity to manage short- and long-term climate risks.
 - (x) **Overall project achievement** provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for all above-mentioned criteria.
 - (xi) **Performance of partners**, including the performance of IFAD and the Government, will be assessed on an individual basis, with a view to the partners' expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.
19. **Rating system.** In line with the practice adopted in many other international financial institutions and UN organizations, IOE uses a six-point rating system, where 6 is the highest score (highly satisfactory) and 1 being the lowest score (highly unsatisfactory).
20. **Data collection.** The PPE will be built on the initial findings from a review of the PCR and other documents. In order to obtain further information, interviews will be conducted both at IFAD headquarters and in the country. During the in-country work, additional primary and secondary data will be collected in order to reach an independent assessment of performance and results. Data collection methods will mostly include qualitative participatory techniques. The methods deployed will consist of individual and group interviews with project stakeholders, beneficiaries and other key informants and resource persons, and direct observations. The PPE will also make use – where applicable – of additional data available through the

⁹ An average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits will the project performance rating.

programme's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. Triangulation will be applied to verify findings emerging from different information sources.

21. **Stakeholders' participation.** In compliance with the IOE Evaluation Policy, the main project stakeholders will be involved throughout the PPE. This will ensure that the key concerns of the stakeholders are taken into account, that the evaluators fully understand the context in which the programme was implemented, and that opportunities and constraints faced by the implementing institutions are identified. Regular interaction and communication will be established with APR and with the Government. Formal and informal opportunities will be explored during the process for the purpose of discussing findings, lessons and recommendations.

Evaluation process

22. Following a desk review of PCR and other key project documents, the PPE will involve following steps:
- **Country work.** The PPE mission is scheduled for the period of 19– 27 September 2016. It will interact with representatives from the government and other institutions, beneficiaries and key informants, in Malé and in the field. At the end of the mission, a wrap-up meeting will be held in Malé to summarize the preliminary findings and discuss key strategic and operational issues. The IFAD country programme manager and/or country programme officer for the Maldives is expected to participate in the wrap-up meeting.
 - **Report drafting and peer review.** After the field visit, a draft PPE report will be prepared and submitted to IOE internal peer review for quality assurance.
 - **Comments by APR and the Government.** The draft PPE report will be shared simultaneously with APR and the Government for review and comment. IOE will finalize the report following receipt of comments by APR and the Government and prepare the audit trail.
 - **Management response by APR.** A written management response on the final PPE report will be prepared by the Programme Management Department. This will be included in the PPE report, when published.
 - **Communication and dissemination.** The final report will be disseminated among key stakeholders and the evaluation report published by IOE, both online and in print.
23. **Field visit site selection:** Given the limited schedule for the field visit, the field visit sites are selected based on the following criteria:
- (i) project investment allocation: the activities received higher investment allocation, priority will be given for site selection;
 - (ii) representative of different activities: both fishery component (e.g. fish market and ice-plants), agriculture component (e.g. community organization, agriculture center), and policy component (e.g. quarantine center) have all given respective attention. Within the same type of activity, different performance levels have also been considered to ensure representativeness;
 - (iii) overlap of various activities: to maximize the time, if one island has multiple activities carried out, priority will be given;
 - (iv) accessibility: local transportation availability and time span for travel.
- The team has also consulted IFAD country program team and project team in the field for site selection to ensure the field visit is efficient and practical.

Specific issues for this PPE

24. **Evaluation criteria in this PPE.** Among the standard evaluation criteria mentioned in paragraph 16, based on the preliminary review of the project documents and PCR, the criterion for "adaptation to climate change" may not be

rated unless the PPE mission reveals any relevant programme contribution worthwhile noting – positive or negative – in this regard. It is also noted that at the time the programme was designed, there was no specific attention of this agenda.

25. **Key issues for PPE investigation.** A PPE is a project evaluation with a limited scope and resources. As such, PPEs are not expected to investigate all activities financed under the project or to undertake an in-depth impact assessment. Key selected issues to be reviewed based on the initial desk review are presented below. These may be fine-tuned based on further considerations or information availability, consultation with APR and the Government.

- (i) **Targeting, coverage, and gender focus.** There are three issues that have a bearing on the outreach and impact of programme services:
- a. Whether or not the project area selection was realistic and supported by sound diagnosis (i.e. the damage caused by the Tsunami and poverty incidence). This becomes even more significant given the reduction of the project area (see paragraph 4) and the lack of time for the satisfactory preparation of project design;
 - b. Whether or not a single geographic targeting strategy rather than a strategy specifically targeting poor people is sufficient to benefit poor people;
 - c. Given the lack of a gender mainstreaming strategy, how far did the project contribute to women's empowerment?

Taking into account these issues, the PPE will review: (a) the project's ability to reach its target group and the strategy to achieve it; (b) the extent of project results and impacts on various groups of the rural communities, with special attention to women; and (c) the role of and efforts made by IFAD to incorporate the issues concerning gender in project design and also during implementation through supervision missions and the MTR.

- (ii) **Relevance of project redesign and justification of increased policy support costs.** Table 1 shows that the investment components (component A and B) were greatly reduced (from 89 per cent to 55 per cent) whilst those financing activities in policy strengthening and institutional capacity building increased as did management costs (component C and D). Considering the project's goal and objective in restoring agricultural production and fishery operation to pre-tsunami levels, it is important to investigate:
- a. whether the redesign was relevant to the beneficiaries' needs five years after the Tsunami;
 - b. what relevance did these activities have for the pro-poor aspects of the programme;
 - c. what has the funding of "policy support" supported and whether it was effective in building the human and institutional capacities of relevant stakeholders, generating an enabling policy environment for both agriculture and fishery industry development.

The mission will attempt to identify the reasons for such high policy support and project coordination costs and investigate how those activities are relevant to project objectives and beneficiaries' needs. A set of indicators will be developed to assess various activities under the policy support component and how these relate to the objectives of the project.

- (iii) **Project effectiveness in restoring the country's fishing operations:** There are no data on changes in post-harvest losses, the scale of fishing operations and the size of fish catches, or household fishery incomes. The only reference cited by the PCR comes from key informant interviews and

focus group discussions. These indicate that women in Maduvvaree found the trainings on fish processing and handling very helpful, resulting in increased number of household participating in the dried fish business. Considering the planned activities on fishing vessels construction and fishing landing sites did not materialise, and only 157 people were trained in the fisheries sector, the PPE team will assess to what extent the programme has achieved the set objective of restoring the country's fishing operations, whether the improved technology, regulations, and institutions will reduce future risks, and what contextual factors have affected it. The team will also work to gather more quantitative/qualitative information changes in post-harvest loss, size of fishing operations and fish catches, and household incomes. Additionally, with its support in joining India Ocean Tuna Commission and MSC certification, has the project made Maldivian tuna more attractive in the international market thus generating greater income for the country?

- (iv) **Project effectiveness in supporting agricultural sector.** The project supported the formation of producer cooperatives (i.e. CBPO) in a number of islands, a major innovation in the Maldivian context. What is not clear however is how far these cooperatives have been successful in improving cooperative agriculture production, promoting agriculture products' access to market, and facilitating the adoption of environmentally sustainable farming practice; and how many are still functioning. The project also provided training for agricultural personnel both locally and abroad. Again, it is unclear as to what extent poor farmers have benefited from this training, whether these personnel are still active in agriculture and what their impact, and the impact of adaptive research, has been. The team will attempt to identify the degree to which these activities and others in the agricultural sector have improved the livelihoods of poor people.
- (v) **Project efficiency.** There are major questions concerning the efficiency of the project. The non-operation of three out of four constructed fish markets, the non-materialization of the fish-landing site, and the shrinking of the programme area all appear to indicate major inefficiencies in the programme. The project beneficiary size needs to be further verified, so that the unit cost per beneficiary can be determined. Programme implementation cost rose to 12.0 per cent of the total budget compared to 2.8 per cent allocated at programme design. This again has to be assessed in terms of efficiency. The PPE team will assess the project efficiency compared with other IFAD operations implemented in Maldives, other post-emergency/tsunami projects conducted by IFAD in other countries, and other post-Tsunami projects implemented at the same time period by other international agencies. Furthermore, given the nature of the programme, the significant delay in project implementation delayed critical rehabilitation activities (it was finally completed 9 years after the disaster had occurred), which raises issues concerning project relevance and IFAD's ability to respond to emergency situations.
- (vi) **Programme impact.** The measurable evidence on rural poverty impact is very limited. The project supervision reports and PCR have repeatedly pointed to the weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation system of the project. Although an outcome impact study was conducted, there is still very limited quantitative data or analysis on any of the four impact domains.¹⁰ Other difficulties in assessing the project impact include: records of beneficiaries and the details of the outcomes were not well maintained; no data was collected from a control area which could allow comparison studies; and the baseline data was collected in such a way that pre- and post-project

¹⁰ i.e. household income and net assets, human and social capital and empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, and institutions and policies.

analysis is extremely difficult.¹¹ The PPE team will conduct focus group discussions to better understand the project's impact on various domains and also use secondary household survey data to support the analysis if available. For example, the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2002/2003 and 2009/2010) may shed light on some of the poverty impact aspects.

- (vii) **Sustainability of programme benefits.** The PPE will pay particular attention to the sustainability of economic and financial impacts on fishery and agriculture activities. At the policy level the key question is the degree to which training and general support will continue to inform national level policy making. At more local levels, there are questions as to the viability of the one fish market which is still functioning. There are also issues concerning the credit supplied to ice-plants and the degree to which this will continue after the end of the project. As far as the agricultural sector is concerned, there are issues concerning the long term viability of local level producer cooperatives (the CBPOs) and the degree to which personnel trained by the project have and will remain active in this sector. Furthermore, the team will try to assess whether any increase in household incomes from fishery/agriculture has been sustained since the end of the project, and what fishery/agricultural producers think will happen in the future. As for fishery component specifically, whether the fisheries management system (the tracking equipment and so on) is being run in a fashion, which indicates sustainability - e.g. replacement of equipment; further training.)
- (viii) **Environment sustainability and natural resource management.** Given the environment vulnerable situation of the country, the aspect of environment and natural resource management is also critical to assess the impact of the intervention. The following key questions will be answered to understand this issue: (i) whether certification of MSC and member of IOTC will imply positive fishery activities and natural resource management in the country, and how it will affect fish stocks and ecosystem; (ii) whether the training on traditional fishery processing and reduced fish processing and waste on the beaches would affect environment sustainability in large; (iii) whether the improved agricultural practices (e.g. soil and moisture conservation, biological pest control, and organic agriculture) would bring a positive contribution to natural resource management.
26. The team will consist of Ms Shijie Yang, IOE Evaluation Analyst and Mr Roderick Stirrat (Fishery and Agriculture expert, IOE consultant). The team will be responsible for the final delivery of the report, under the supervision of Mr Fabrizio Felloni, Lead Evaluation Officer, IOE.

Background documents

27. The key background documents for the exercise will include the following:

PT-AFRP project specific documents

- Appraisal report (2005)
- IFAD President's Report (2005)
- Design report (pre-implementation version) (2006)
- Mid-term review report (2009)
- Programme financing agreement (2005) and amendments
- Supervision mission aide-memoire and reports (2008-2013)
- Project status reports (2008-2013)
- Project completion report (2014)
- Baseline assessment report (2009)
- Outcome impact survey (2014)

¹¹ The baseline study was conducted on secondary data and did not focus on the beneficiaries of the project (outcome impact survey, p. 46).

General and others

- IFAD (2015). Evaluation Manual – Second Edition
- IOE (2012). Guidelines for the project completion report validation and project performance assessment.
- IFAD (2011). IFAD Evaluation Policy.
- Various IFAD Policies and Strategies, in particular, Strategic Framework (2002-2006), Rural Finance, Rural Enterprise, Targeting, Gender Equity and Women's Empowerment.

List of key persons met

Government

Ministry of Finance and Treasury

Name	Title
Aminath Nashia	Director
Mohamed Zahy	Senior Programme Officer
Fathimath Mohamed	Senior Debt Accounting Analyst

Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture

Hussain Sinan	Permanent Secretary
Zaha Waheed	Executive Coordinator
Fazna Mayam	Programme Director
Muna Mohamed Hamid	Assistant Director
Ariyam Simla	Senior Research Officer
Noora Jaled	Senior Programme Officer
Ali Amir	Director
Mohamed Anees	Senior Quarantine Officer
Amirath Rishad	Senior Data Processing Officer
Aishath Fahtema	Assistant Director
Adam Manik	Deputy Director General
Huaain Ikram	Accounts Officer
Dr Naseer	Former Permanent Secretary of MoFA
Ibrahim Shabau	Former Deputy Director General of MoFA and programme coordinator for Agriculture

Island Councils

Adhuham Fallfou	Councillor in Nolvivaramfaru
Mohamed Hassan	Councillor in Nolvivaramfaru
Ismail Faazi Faarooq	Vice President of Maduvaree Island council
Mohamed Shaukath	Assistant Deputy Director Maduvaree Island Council
Mohamed Shakir	Deputy Director, Maduvaree Island Council
Husnee Hussain	Member, Maduvaree Island Council
Abdul Shathir	President of Gamanafushi Island Council
Rahman Shakir	Member of Gamanafushi Island Council
Anwa Ali	Director of Goidhoo Island Council
Shahula Naila	Member of Goidhoo Island Council

Private sector

Hussain Aleef	General Manager of Ensis Fisheries
Zhmed Zeenad	Head of Business Banking, Bank of Maldives
Mohamed Nahushan	Business Banking Manager, Bank of Maldives


Research and training institutions

Shiham Adam	Director of General for Marine Research Section
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Beneficiaries

Hussain Habed	Farmer in Nolhivaramfaru island
Dawood Hassan	Farmer in Nolhivaramfaru island
Saudhiya Ahmed	Farmer in Nolhivaramfaru island
Mariyam Gasim	Farmer in Nolhivaramfaru island
Mohammed Ahmed	Fishman in Goidhoo island
Hassan Shubee	Fishman in Goidhoo island
Gaafa Alifu	Gamanafushi cooperative society staff
Mohamed Shaan	CBPO facilitator in Goidhoo island
Nolhivaram	CBPO facilitator in Ibrahim Siraj
Ibrahim	Fishery processor in Gamanafushi
Aslam	Fishery processor in Maduvari
Abudlar	Fishery processor in Maduvari

Theory of change



Project logics: comparison of different basic project documents

<i>Design document (2005)</i>	<i>President's Report</i>	<i>Financing agreement</i>	<i>MTR (revitalization)</i>	<i>PCR</i>
<p>Overall goal: Contribute to restoration of <u>agricultural GDP</u> to levels achieved previous to the occurrence of the Tsunami and return to stable long term growth trend, while reducing the <u>vulnerability</u> of the sector to natural disasters.</p>	<p>Overall goal: Contribute to restoring <u>agricultural gross domestic product</u> to pre-tsunami levels, returning the economy to a stable, long-term growth trend and reducing the <u>fishery sector's vulnerability</u> to natural disasters.</p> <p>Logframe of President's Report: Contribute to the restoration of <u>agricultural GDP</u> to levels reached previous to the occurrence of the tsunami and return to stable and long-term growth, while improving the livelihood of affected people and reducing their <u>vulnerability</u> to natural disasters</p>	<p>Overall goal: Contribute to restoring <u>agricultural gross domestic product</u> to pre-tsunami levels, returning the economy to a stable, long-term growth trend and reducing the <u>fishery sector's vulnerability</u> to natural disaster</p>	<p>Overall goal: Contribute to the restoration of <u>fisheries and agricultural GDP</u> to levels reached previous to the occurrence of the tsunami and return to stable and long-term growth, while improving the livelihood of affected people and reducing their <u>vulnerability</u> to natural disasters.</p>	<p>Overall goal: Contribute to the restoration of <u>agricultural and fisheries GDP</u> to level reached previous to the occurrence of the Tsunami and return to stable and long-term growth, while improving the livelihood of affected people and reducing their <u>vulnerability</u> to disasters.</p>
<p>Specific objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For the fisheries sub-sector, resuming and improving operating conditions of commercial and artisanal fishing fleets in order to restore sustainable fish capture and processing, aiming at rebuilding and protecting livelihoods, and augment household income of fisher folk. - For agriculture, to resume and improve production in the target atolls in order to rebuild and protect livelihoods, improve the diet of islanders, increase household income, reduce poverty and assure food security. 	<p>Specific objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It will help to re-establish the country's fishing operations and augment the household income of fishers by restoring their livelihoods. - With regard to agriculture, the programme will work to resume crop production in the atolls so as to rebuild the islanders' livelihoods and improve their diet, increase household income, reduce poverty and ensure food security <p>In the logframe</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribute to the improvement of operating conditions of the fishing fleets and increase the quality of the catches - Contribute to the recovery and improvement of agricultural production in the islands affected by the tsunami 	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For the fisheries sub-sector, the programme shall focus on resuming and improving the operating conditions of the fishing fleet to restore sustainable fish capture and processing, aimed at rebuilding and protecting livelihoods, and augment household income of fisher-folk. - For agriculture, the Programme shall seek to resume and improve production in the atolls in order to rebuild and protect livelihoods, improve the diet of islanders, increase household income, reduce poverty and contribute to higher food security. 	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to improve and support sustainable operating conditions for small and medium scale fish harvesters and processors within well regulated environment to maintain or improve livelihoods of island communities; - to improve and support sustainable production practices towards as more organised small and medium scale agriculture producers to improve livelihoods of island communities <p>In the logframe</p> <p>Component objective 1: Improved and sustainable operating conditions for small and medium scale fish harvesters and processors to maintain or improve livelihoods of island communities.</p> <p>Component objective 2: Improved and sustainable production practices of organized small and medium scale agriculture producers to improve livelihoods of island communities.</p> <p>Component objective 3: Enhanced human resource capacity for policy, planning and management at MoFA</p>	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - With regard to fisheries, the programme will help re-establish the country's fishing operations and augment the household income of fishers by restoring their livelihoods. - With regard to agriculture, the programme will work to resume crop production on the atolls so as to rebuild the islanders' livelihoods and improve their diet, increase household income, reduce poverty and contribute to greater food security. <p>In the log frame</p> <p>Outcome 1: Improved and sustainable operating conditions for small and medium scale fish harvesters and processors.</p> <p>Outcome 2: Improved and sustainable production practices of organized small and medium scale agriculture producers.</p> <p>Outcome 3: Enhanced national capacity in policy formulation, planning and</p>

<i>Design document (2005)</i>	<i>President's Report</i>	<i>Financing agreement</i>	<i>MTR (revitalization)</i>	<i>PCR</i>
				management in the fisheries and agriculture sectors
<p>Programme outputs:</p> <p>Component 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Replacement of fishing vessels, - Installation of ice plants in fishing islands, - Establishment of fishing receiving stations, - Construction of cold storage facilities at selected islands, - Training and extension to staff and fishermen. <p>Component 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of a new fresh foods market facility in Malé, - Strengthening the capacity of Agricultural Centres to conduct adaptive research and deliver extension services to farmers. <p>Component 3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Finance staff training, studies, regional consultancies and national workshops and seminars in relevant policy related subjects. 	<p>Programme outputs:</p> <p>Component 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Replacement of fishing vessels - Establishment of fish markets - Establishment of ice plants - Establishment of cold storage facilities - Training and extension activities in fisheries <p>Component 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Construction of fresh food market facility in Malé - Strengthening the capacity of the Agricultural Centres <p>Component 3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relevant fisheries and agricultural policies enhanced 		<p>Programme outputs:</p> <p>Component 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Subcomponent 1.1: Support to Fisheries Production <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Replacement of Fishing Vessels b. Installation of ice plants - Subcomponent 1.2: Fish Marketing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Fish markets b. A revolving credit facility c. Support to Hulhumale fish landing site - Subcomponent 1.3: Training and extension <p>Component 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Subcomponent 1: Agricultural marketing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Upgrading of Agriculture Market in Malé - Subcomponent 2: Strengthening the Capacity of the Agriculture Centers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Infrastructure support b. Capacity-building c. Community farmer's organization <p>Component 3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Subcomponent 1: Capacity-building of MoFA staff - Subcomponent 2: Strengthening of the Fisheries industry and regulatory structure - Subcomponent 3: Diversification of capture fisheries - Subcomponent 4: Organizing the fisheries industry - Subcomponent 5: Agriculture Master Plan 	<p>Programme outputs:</p> <p>Component 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Four fish market centers established in selected islands - Credit provided for SME scale ice production units, RSW/ onboard and VMS - Fish landing facilities in Hulhumale constructed <p>Component 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improved facilities of two agricultural centers - Improved capacities of MoFA staff in the agricultural centers. - CBPOs are established and capable of applying on farm adaptive research programme <p>Component 3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fisheries Master Plan finalized - Capacity for regional and international cooperation of MoFA/Government developed - National Monitoring Control and Surveillance complying with international standards and conventions implemented - Capacity-building of FTC staff - Functioning and legitimate CBPOs established and working in partnership with MoFA and FTC - Boat Building Code established and implemented - Maldivian fish and fisheries products from pole and line/hand line certified - Training in quality standards for traditional processing of Maldives fish facilitated - CBPO facilitators trained by FTC - Functioning and legitimate CBPOs established and working in partnership with MoFA and FTC - Agriculture Master Plan finalized

Detailed summary of programme outputs and implementation history

	<i>Pre (1)-post (2) revitalization</i>	<i>History</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Fishing sector			
Construction of new boats	1	The original plan was for 10 pole and line vessels, 20 per cent of the total to be built by agencies in the Maldives. By the appraisal stage the Government changed the request to eight long lining vessels. Request for new vessels abandoned at the time of the MTR as the new government withdrew request.	It was never really clear whom the boats were for, except for talk of tsunami-affected islands. Also it is unclear why there was a shift to long liners. IFAD seems to have been in response mode – but by the time they took over the direct supervision of the programme IFAD was definitely not in favour of financing boats. Other donors had dealt with this.
Ice plants	1/2	<p>The original plan was for IFAD to fund 4 ice plants although planned ownership was not clear. Nothing was done by time of change of government.</p> <p>The new government was against direct funding and requested IFAD to fund a loan system for four ice plants, ostensibly for SMEs. But the four chosen organizations were clearly not SMEs. This element was successful and there were plans to establish a revolving self-sustaining fund to support ice plant construction. There was a second round of ice plant loans (3) but this seems to be the end of the scheme and now there is no revolving fund.</p> <p>There were also plans to improve refrigerated sea water/cooled sea water facilities on vessels to reduce post-harvest losses. This was dropped.</p>	This was a success in terms of financing ice plants, but none of the planned support was given to SMEs.
Fish landing sites	1/2	<p>These are frequently referred to as 'markets', but they were not markets. Rather they were planned as sites for hygienic cutting and gutting of fish being landed for local processing. There were four in the original plans. By the time of the MTR, IFAD was unhappy with these landing sites – but the Government was unable to get out of political commitments to build them. IFAD pushed the plan that upper stories should be let out to generate income to help support running costs. There were problems in getting contractors but eventually all were built. The hope was that the private sector would come forward to run them but none were willing so they were taken over by island councils.</p> <p>Of the four, only one seems to have even approximately functioned as planned, but it was not being used when the mission visited. One is used as a store and the fish gutting/cleaning function has been abandoned. The other two not used for fish-related activities.</p>	There was some confusion from the start. The label 'markets' was always misleading. The idea seems to have been that they would supply hygienic conditions for fish cutting. Most quality fish is sold at sea to collector vessels, so what is landed is second rate fish, either too small or going off, which is then sold to local processors. What is not clear is whether there were any signs of any demand for these fish landing sites. Clearly local processors don't seem that interested and the landings are erratic (the collector vessels come first). Also there is competition between various islands to buy fish for processing. So there is no steady supply of fish to any one landing site.
Fish landing facilities in Hulhumale	2	The aim was to construct modern and efficient fish landing facilities in Hulhumale near major fish processing plants to remove the stress on the Malé landing site. Detailed plans were drawn up but the facilities were not constructed because of disagreements over siting and management.	

Agriculture			
Contribute to the relocation of the Southern Region Agriculture Centre	1/2	The pre-existing Southern Agriculture Centre was destroyed by the tsunami and the Government decided to move it to another island (which is populated). IFAD's contribution consisted of support to build staff quarters. There were major delays in planning and construction. The building was completed in 2013 but by 2016 the Centre was still not functioning. There are issues concerning who is to pay for other buildings on the site.	
Contribute to capacity development of MoFA staff	2	The programme supported agriculture diploma level training for MoFA staff and certain programme staff. A total of 11 (eight extension workers from MoFA, and three programme staff) completed their diploma training at the G.B. Pant University in India by 2012.	This training did have an impact on farmers in some of the islands. The Outcome-Impact Survey reports that the training offered by staff supported by the programme, especially in the use of composting and organic fertilizers, was well received. In all, training was supplied to 2,842 people whilst programme-trained MoFA staff were also available for advice on such matters as pest control. They were also responsible for the introduction of new crops in some islands (e.g. Kinbidhoo where over 50% of farmers tried new crops) although others (e.g. Fuvahmulah) rejected new crops on the basis of the risk involved.
Contribute to formation of CBPOs	2	The original target was for 150 CBPOs to be established by 2011. The aim was that CBPOs would facilitate increased production of high value crops for sale to resort islands and other buyers. By 2013 supervision report states that only 10 were in existence of which 5 were working 'properly'.	<p>The idea of CBPOs was unrealistic in the Maldivian context. The appraisal report made it clear that a cooperative approach was unlikely to succeed. At the time of Revitalization, plans for CBPOs were extremely sketchy and lacked clarity of purpose.</p> <p>Given the misgivings at the appraisal stage the question of why CBPOs were supported is interesting. It would appear that despite available evidence, both Government and IFAD were committed to this approach.</p> <p>The goal of producing high value crops for sale to resort islands and Malé was also unrealistic. Scale of production too small and sporadic to attract major buyers or support reliable transport facilities.</p> <p>Where they were relatively successful was when FADIP was involved with resources devoted to establishing market chains. This was noted in supervision reports.</p>
Training of CBPO facilitators	2	<p>Facilitators were expected to assist in the formation of CBPOs but also to act as channels through which information and advice could be passed from the extension service to the farmers.</p> <p>Training of the facilitators was contracted to ICRAF and in 2010, 33 potential facilitators, 23 from the programme and 10 from the MoFA began training. Of these, four programme personnel failed level 1 whilst a total of 16 (from both the programme and MoFA) passed level 2. In 2011 the supervision mission reported that of eight facilitators who had passed level 2 and five assistant facilitators who had passed level 1, only six (one facilitator and five assistant facilitators) were still in post. By 2013 it was reported that 17 facilitators had been trained, eight from MoFA and nine from the programme.</p>	Not surprisingly these facilitators had a negligible impact on island agriculture. Numbers were too few to cover the islands targeted by the programme even though this had been reduced from 50 to 25. Those recruited by the programme were mainly school leavers with little experience in or knowledge of agriculture, or of what their role might be (43.3 % were 20 years old or under). Facilitators were employed on a part time basis and were paid between MVR 1250 and 3000 per annum (US\$83 to 200) by the programme. Some facilitators indicated to the team that they had little incentive to conduct training sessions as they were neither paid nor supported by local authorities. Finally, the training received from ICRAF concentrated on technical issues rather than on social issues related to the formation of producer groups. All these factors limited the extent to which facilitators could be expected to have

			any effect on local agricultural practices. As one facilitator (with a strong interest in composting) told the evaluation team, islanders were unwilling to take advice from a young man with little experience in agriculture.
Upgrading fresh produce market in Malé	1	This did not take place.	The Government saw land as being too valuable for use as market.
Policy support			
Support for finalization of the Fisheries Master Plan.	2	Support from the programme in terms of finance and consultancies fed into the general process of drawing up the Government's Strategic Action Plan.	
Support to increase MoFA/Government capacity for regional and international cooperation.	2	The programme supported a number of visits by Maldivian personnel to regional meetings and gatherings. By 2011 around 20 senior staff had attended conferences etc. in the region. This had a positive effect in terms of raising the profile of the Maldives in the fisheries sector and encouraging 'networking'. This was an important element in the Maldives acceding to the IOTC. Membership of the IOTC has allowed the Maldives to play a full part in its deliberations and ensure that Maldivian interests are protected.	In the long run an important element in the sustainability of the Maldivian fishery especially considering the migratory tendencies of the fish stocks in the Indian Ocean.
Implementation of Monitoring Control and Surveillance in the Maldives to international standards and conventions facilitated	2	This process was begun in 2010. As yet it is still in the process of becoming effective and has had to deal with issues concerning the supply and costs of telecom services. Only a minority of pole and line vessels are fitted with VLDs. As well as providing hardware and software the programme also supported training.	This is still very much work in progress. But in the long run may well be a major legacy of the programme.
Strengthening the human resource capacity of the Component Authority (MFDA)	2	Overseas and in-country training was supplied to a range of Ministry staff. The PCR reports that 128 trainees attended nine in-country courses whilst six attended a three week course in post-harvest technology in India. This set of training activities was important in gaining EU compliance.	Those the evaluation team talked to were enthusiastic as to the quality and utility of the training received. What impact if any this had on rural livelihoods is uncertain.
Legal revision of the fisheries bill	2	Despite support from the programme in terms of finance and consultancies the plan has not yet been agreed by government. .	
Establish and implement a Boat Building Code	2	The Programme supported consultancy inputs to establish a code. But the code has not been accepted by the Maldivian Transport Authority which is the key agency in this area. The claim is that the MTA do not have suitable equipment to implement the code.	It is surprising that the MTA was not involved from the beginning of this activity.
Maldivian fish and fisheries products from pole and line/hand line certified	2	This was successful. MSC certification is important in ensuring access to lucrative markets in Europe, especially the United Kingdom. This was supported by the training of MFDA inspectors in order to ensure hygiene standards for exported fish.	

Implementation of quality standards for traditional processing of Maldives fish facilitated	2	Training was supplied, but only 30 out of a target of 200 were trained. However, there is no evidence that quality is a major issue in the market for traditionally processed Maldivian fish.	
Training and demonstration of YFT LL on board of FTC vessel supported	2	The programme supplied consultancy inputs into this activity as well as procuring necessary gear. There were however major problems in obtaining a suitable vessel. Recently (2016) a privately owned vessel has been hired by the FTC and some demonstration trips/ training is now taking place.	It remains unclear as to whether or not there is an interest in multi-day fishing for yellow fin tuna in the Maldives. The general consensus appears to be that interest is minimal.
Fisheries Training Centre in Vilingilli effectively provides ToT services to CBPO(s) and industry	2	There was some support for training of staff. The FTC also acted as the base for long-lining demonstrations/training.	
Functioning and legitimate CBPOs are established and work in partnership with MoFA and the FTC	2	There were a few attempts to establish CBPOs in the fishery sector and these failed.	As in agriculture the idea of CBPOs was unrealistic. In the fishery sector it ignored the nature of boat ownership, marketing arrangements and structures of traditional fish processing.
Support for finalization of agriculture master plan	2	This did not take place as FAO took it over.	
MoFA staff trained for first degrees in Policy and Project Management	2	Seven MoFA staff members were awarded degrees in relevant subjects and they are all working in the Ministry

Note: Phase 1 means the phase before revitalization; phase 2 means the phase after revitalization.

Processing time for fish market procurement

Steps	Fisheries Markets (Ga Gemanfushi and Th. Hirilandhoo)	Date	Response time	Responsibility
1	No objection for construction of the two markets	15-Apr-08		
2	Tender Documents sent to IFAD	30-Apr-08	15	Tender Board
3	IFAD responses to Tender Documents	12-May-08	14	IFAD
4	Document changed according to comments	20-May-08	18	PIU and Tender Board
5	Extra comments to document from IFAD	28-May-08	8	IFAD
6	Revised bid document with changes suggested in 5	11-Jun-08	14	PIU and Tender Board
7	Final No objection to Tender Documents	16-Jun-08	5	IFAD
8	Tender Advertisement	21-Jun-08	5	Tender Board
9	Pre-Bid Meeting	1-Jul-08	11	Tender Board in accordance with the number of days in Tender Docs
10	Bid opening	4-Aug-08	34	Tender Board in accordance with the number of days in Tender Docs
11	Bid Evaluation Report sent to IFAD	29-Sep-08	56	Tender Board
12	Comments to Evaluation Report from IFAD	10-Oct-08	11	IFAD
13	Revised Evaluation Report submitted to IFAD	14-Oct-08	4	Tender Board
14	Comments to Revised Evaluation Report from IFAD	23-Nov-08	40	IFAD
15	Submission of final evaluation report from Tender Board for signing	20-Jan-09	58	Tender Board
16	Returned to MOFT after signing	23-Jan-09	3	PIU
17	Sent Final Report sent by MOFT to IFAD for no objections	8-Feb-09	16	ERMS and Tender Board MOFT
18	No objection received	25-Mar-09	45	IFAD
	Fisheries Markets (Th. Vilufushi and M. Maduvvari)		Response time	Responsibility
1	No objection for construction of the two markets (New Locations)	18-Jul-08		
2	Tender Documents sent to IFAD	20-Jul-08	2	Tender Board
3	IFAD responses to Tender Documents	30-Jul-08	10	IFAD
4	Instruction to Tender Board from PIU to advertise	31-Jul-08	1	PIU and Tender Board
5	Tender Advertisement	11-Aug-08	12	Tender Board
6	Pre-Bid Meeting	25-Aug-08	14	Tender Board in accordance with the number of days in Tender Docs
7	Bid opening	18-Sep-08	24	Tender Board in accordance with the number of days in Tender Docs
8	Bid Evaluation Report sent to IFAD	23-Nov-08	66	Tender Board
9	Comments to Revised Evaluation Report from IFAD	23-Nov-08	1	IFAD
10	Submission of final evaluation report from Tender Board for signing	20-Jan-09	58	Tender Board
11	Returned to MOFT after signing	23-Jan-09	3	PIU
12	Sent Final Report sent by MOFT to IFAD for no objections	8-Feb-09	16	ERMS and Tender Board MOFT
13	No objection received	25-Mar-09	45	IFAD

Source: Supervision report (2010)

Credit facility record

Credit facilities recipients for Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme

Disbursements from First Tranche

No	Customer	Project location	Purpose	Amount (MVR)
1	Ensis Fisheries PVT. LTD	Hulhumale'	Ice Plant	1 540 000
2	Ocean Fresh PVT. LTD	Malé Area	Ice Plant	1 500 000
3	United Regional Corporative Society	AA. Ukulhas	Ice Plant	1 540 000
Sum				4 580 000

Disbursements from First Tranche

No	Customer	Project location	Purpose	Amount
1	Kooddoo Fisheries Maldives Limited	G.Dh. Gadhdhoo	Ice Plant	1 800 000
2	Kooddoo Fisheries Maldives Limited	F.Nilandhoo	Ice Plant	1 800 000
3	Kooddoo Fisheries Maldives Limited	G.Dh.Fiyoaree	Ice Plant	1 800 000
4	Khadheeja Moosa	K.Kaashidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
5	Mohamed Mahir	K.Kaashidhoo	Agriculture	49 000
6	Aishath Manike	Ha. Kelaa	Agriculture	50 000
7	Ilyas Ibrahim	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
8	Aishath Azleema	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
9	Ali Aboobakuru	Ha. Filadhoo	Agriculture	50 000
10	Mohamed Moosa	Gdh.Vaadhoo	Agriculture	50 000
11	Aminath Moosa	Gdh.Vaadhoo	Agriculture	50 000
12	Aminath didi	Sh.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
13	Hassan Zareer	Sh.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
14	Aminath Shazna	N.Kendikulhudhoo	Agriculture	50 000
15	Adam Ahmed	N.Kendikulhudhoo	Agriculture	50 000
16	Ibrahim Aboobakuru	Gdh.Vaadhoo	Agriculture	50 000
17	Abdulla Imad	Gdh.Vaadhoo	Agriculture	50 000
18	Mohamed Ali Muneer	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
19	Ahmed Junaad	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
20	Ahmed Majeed	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
21	Ali Naseer	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
22	Mohamed Majeed	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
23	Mariyam Azuma	B.Goidhoo	Agriculture	50 000
Sum				6 399 000

Annex X

	Grand total	10 979 000
7/21/2011	Receipts from IFAD	6 104 000
7/18/2013	Receipts from IFAD	7 655 000
		13 759 000
	Disbursement for ice plants	9 980 000
	Disbursement for agriculture	999 000
	Total refunded	2 780 000

Source: Record from Bank of Maldives


Evaluation matrix for the fishery related activities

Comp	output	Evaluation questions	Indicators	Data source
Comp 1	Fishery market	Is the market still functional?	Yes/No	Direct observation
		How many sites within the market still under operation?	Number/percentage	Direct observation
		How many fishermen or fish traders are using the market?	Number	Market record
		Is there any hygiene equipment installed in the market for longer storage or processing?	Yes/No	Direct observation
		How is the current user fee payment collected? Whether it is sufficient to cover the maintenance cost?	Text Yes/No	Interview with the market manager
		Whether there are more customers after the market built?	Number/percentage change	Interview with fisherman/traders (FGD)
		How is the fishery price change after the market built?	Number	Interview with fisherman/traders (FGD)
		How does the post-harvest loss change after the market built?	Number/percentage change	Interview with fisherman/traders (FGD)
	Ice plants	How many ice plants are still under operation?	Number	Direct observation
		How are they maintained and managed?	Text	Interview
		How many fish now can be stored to access the market after the built of ice plants? (before and after) Volume of marketable fish increased by x per cent and access to markets in selected ice-plant islands by y per cent	Number percentage	Interview with fisherman (FGD) Administrative data
		How does the post-harvest loss change after the ice plants?	Number	Interview with fisherman (FGD)
		How are the ice plants maintained? Who is responsible? Is there user fee paid and is this adequate?	Text	Plant Manager
		How has fishermen income change with better storage and access to market?	Number	Interview with fisherman (FGD)
	Landing cite	Though it is not materialized, has the procurement done? What is the cost attributed to this activity?	Text	Desk review
Comp 3	Output 3.1: The Fisheries Master Plan			
	Output 3.2: Capacity development of MoFA/ Government for regional/international cooperation			

Output 3.3: Monitoring Control and Surveillance system	Is the system still in place and functioning?	Yes/no	Site visit
	What changes in fish catches before and after Monitoring Control and Surveillance system was put in place?	Number	Data record
	How have illegal fishing activities changed before and after?	Number	Data record
	How many surveillance patrolling activities are operated with this system annually? (Before and after) OR total patrol days at sea per year in targeted fisheries	Number Number	Data record
	How many vessel location devices (VLD) were installed and how many are still in use?	Number	Data record
Output 3.4: HR capacity building of MFDA	How much percentage of the training content is used in daily work?	percentage	Interview with fisherman (FGD)
Output 3.5 Revision of the fisheries bill	Has it finalized?	Yes/No	
Output 3.6: Boat building code	Has it established and implemented?	Yes/No	Desk review Interview
	If not, why it failed to establish? If yes, how much percentage of boats are built under the code?	Text percentage	Interview Administrative data
Output 3.7: MSC certification of Maldives fish and fisheries products	Did the fish and fisheries products get Monitoring Control and Surveillance label? Is the label still there?	Yes/no	interview
	Which markets is Maldives able to access to? How many? (before and after)	Number/text	Administrative record/ interview
	What is the price/volume for some fish or fisheries products to be exported? (before and after)	Number/text	Administrative record/ interview
Output 3.8: training of traditional processing	What are the beneficiaries profile? How much percentage of fisherman trained are under poverty?	Text percentage	Administrative record
	TOT: how many people are able to train others the traditional methods of processing fish?	Number	
Output 3.9: training and demonstration of yellow fin tuna longline fishing on board the FTC vessels	Has this activity procured? What is the cost of it?	Yes/No Number	Project record
	Is the FTC vessel still under operation?	Yes/no	Site visit/interview

Fishery sector context

1. Maldives' fishery value chain



1. **Value chain:** Over 90 per cent of fishery investment is focused on two fisheries, servicing five value chains. These are shown below:
 - The Pole and Line fishery is mostly (but not exclusively) undertaken in locally built 3rd generation dhonis, up to 35 m in length. They predominantly catch skipjack tuna. This is mostly sold to collector vessels, which freeze or chill the fish on board, or directly to one of three large freezing facilities. Some surplus is sold to local artisanal processors.
 - The Line Fishery: Line fishing is also carried out by smaller motorised craft. The larger vessels mainly supply the fresh fish export market.
 - Artisanal processors will generally smoke – dry the fish to service the regional and local market. There is a large domestic and regional market for traditionally processed fish. Fish processors in the artisanal industry may process 500-700 kg per day, but face limited access to fish, as fishermen prefer to sell to the larger companies that can supply them with fuel and ice.¹

2. Social economic status of fisheries

2. Fishing vessels are largely held privately by enterprising fishermen, or shore-based owners who may own vessels but do not participate in fishing trips and whose ownership is generally limited to one, or at most two, boats. These vessels sell their fish to processing companies, either through shore-based facilities or collector vessels, or to the cottage industry, consisting of small-scale artisanal family businesses that smoke and dry the fish, or produce fish paste. Some of the processing companies own and operate their own vessels (Linton and Shareef, 2011), but the majority of the vessels remain privately operated. The larger

¹ Source: Linton, John and Shareef, Fareeha, Financial Services for the Fisheries Sector: Maldives Case study.

processing companies appear reluctant to invest in their own vessels, as such a step is deemed politically sensitive, representing an upset of established practice (Horizon interview).

3. In terms of cost-sharing, most commonly, the boat owner takes a 50 per cent share of the revenue to cover capital and operating costs and profit, with the remainder of the revenue shared among crew members.
4. Both processing companies and the artisanal industry purchase fish directly from fishermen, cash-in-hand, but processing companies also provide fuel and ice, which provides them with an important advantage. It is a very dynamic process for fish trading in the sense that fishermen call different collector vessels and islands to negotiate price and then decide where to land and sell. Generally they sell to the one or two companies that operate in their area, mostly based on considerations of convenience, as prices are generally the same between the companies. Fish is then sold fresh to export markets, processed into canned tuna, or frozen for shipment to overseas canners, particularly in Thailand.²

² Source: International Pole and Line Foundation. Technical report, A Socio-Economic Assessment of the Tuna Fisheries in the Maldives (2012).

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Independent Office of Evaluation
International Fund for Agricultural Development
Via Paolo di Dono, 44 - 00142 Rome, Italy
Tel: +39 06 54591 - Fax: +39 06 5043463
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